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Summary: This study looks at the challenges facing Bangladesh in sustaining high 
growth in its labour-intensive manufacturing. Sustaining this output growth and 
achieving wage growth and improvements in working conditions requires 
technological upgrading and moving up the value chain. This study examines the 
challenges this poses by looking at the premier manufacturing sector in Bangladesh, 
the ready-made garments industry. 
 
The problems faced by developing country firms in upgrading their technology and 
moving up the value chain are well-known in broad terms. These include in particular 
problems of i) financing the acquisition of new (and therefore more risky) 
technologies, ii) upskilling workers and employees, and iii) acquiring land for 
contiguous expansion, particularly in locational clusters. A second set of problems to 
do with infrastructural constraints, utility supplies and predictability of policies are 
already well known. Many of the established policy responses to the problems of 
technology upgrading focus on the second set of issues through good governance and 
improvements in the investment climate. We argue that the international evidence 
suggests that these approaches are unlikely to make an impact in the short to medium 
term. In contrast we suggest that a clear understanding of specific problems and 
targeted policy and governance responses is the way forward. It draws on an intensive 
survey in Bangladesh of a number of firms in the sector. It suggests that by beginning 
with existing Bangladeshi financial and other instruments and development 
experiences, incremental improvements in policies and governance capabilities can 
make a significant positive impact. Concrete policy suggestions are put forward for 
further development and policy advocacy in each of the three broad categories of 
problems faced by the garment sector.   
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Developing countries like Bangladesh have transformed their manufacturing sectors 
in the last two decades by expanding their exports of labour-intensive manufacturing 
products. Bangladesh has achieved double digit growth rates in exports of garments 
for over two decades, summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Bangladesh Ready-Made Garments Industry Annual Rates of Growth of 
Dollar Value of Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total RMG Export 
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
While much of this growth has been at the lower ends of the value chain, there is also 
evidence of growing backward linkages and diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of 
export value was value added in the domestic economy due to growing backward 
linkages in spinning, weaving, dyeing and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; 
World Bank 2005; Ahmed and Hossain 2006). However, it is also widely recognized 
that the Bangladesh garment industry operates at the lower end of the value chain.  
 
For instance, the average per kilogram price of its knitwear exports to the European 
Union market is around half that of India or China, and around one third that of 
Turkey (Rahman 2004). Within this product basket, when we compare unit prices of 
Bangladeshi exports with that from other countries, Bangladeshi prices are 
comparable to its competitors, suggesting that its lower wages do not give it any 
significant advantage over competitors. Bangladesh’s wage rates in the garment 
industry are also known to be one of the lowest internationally and the lowest 
amongst its regional South Asian competitors (Ahmed and Hossain 2006: Figure 4).  
 
Taking these facts together, it follows that Bangladesh has the lowest value-added per 
employee amongst the major garment exporting countries, and this is sustained by 
having one of the lowest wages and salaries per employee (Mlachila and Yang 2004: 
Table 9). Mlachila and Yang’s figures show that around 1997-2001, Bangladeshi 
value-added per employee was less than one-fifth that of China, and about a third of 
that of India. Bangladeshi wages and salaries were a quarter of China and just over 
half the Indian average. Recent trends in wages across countries suggest that these 
ratios are unlikely to have changed very much. It is also true that wages and 
conditions in the garments industry have become a growing source of friction between 
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management and workers. In 2007 and 2008, garment industry workers continued to 
protest despite the state of emergency declared by the interim caretaker government.  
 
These observations suggest that Bangladesh concentrates on a low-value product mix 
in its export basket, and even within that low-value product mix, its competitiveness is 
based on low wages that compensate for its lower productivity. This allows 
Bangladesh to sell low-value products at the same price as its competitors, most of 
whom can afford to pay somewhat higher wages. This situation is precarious not only 
because there are other low wage countries trying to enter this market, but also 
because the low wages of Bangladeshi garment workers cannot be taken as a given, 
particularly given the mobilization of garment workers over the last several years 
demanding higher wages and better conditions. Both moving up the value chain into 
higher value-added products and raising productivity are critically important for 
Bangladesh.  
 
Sometimes, looking at value chain analyses for poor countries like Bangladesh can 
give the misleading impression that because labour cost is a small part of the price of 
the final product, improvements in labour productivity will have a small effect on 
price competitiveness. For instance, Khondker and Razzaque (2003: 20) using World 
Bank data on integrated value chain analysis for the Bangladesh garment industry 
argue that a doubling of labour productivity would only have an effect of 3 cents on 
the price of a typical T-shirt and would therefore not significantly affect Bangladesh’s 
competitiveness.  
 
This type of conclusion is misleading because a doubling of productivity would allow 
a doubling of all wages in the firm, which would not be insignificant. Alternatively, it 
would allow an increase in profits for the firm in the tens if not hundreds of thousands 
of dollars every year, depending on the size of the firm. This is obviously because a 
few cents on a T-shirt translates into large sums of money over a production cycle. 
This is also why orders can move from country to country in response to these few 
cents given the absolute sums that are involved. Obviously, it is also important to 
move up into higher value-added products, and this too is a goal of technology 
upgrading. 
 
Clearly, to sustain Bangladesh’s growth and to provide higher wages and better 
conditions to workers, it will have to make sustained progress in technology 
upgrading and in moving up the value-chain (Gereffi and Memedovic 2003; ILO 
2005; World Bank 2005).  The challenge is particularly serious because staying in the 
same place is not an option. Bangladesh faces persistent competition from above as 
more advanced countries like China and India begin to enjoy access to protected 
markets as a result of the MFA phase-out. The effects are not yet fully obvious 
because these countries are making significant investments to upgrade their 
technologies to compete in previously restricted markets. The full effects of this will 
become apparent once these investments come on-stream in the next few years.  
 
India, in particular, has undertaken a significant investment strategy to upgrade textile 
sector technologies using government subsidies and well over one billion dollars of 
subsidy have been disbursed so far (Ananthakrishnan and Jain-Chandra 2005: 23). 
But Bangladesh also faces competition from below as other low wage countries like 
Vietnam, Cambodia and very soon African countries are likely to exploit the 
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privileged access they have been granted to European markets, and they too will be 
trying to muscle into Bangladesh’s traditional markets at the low end of the value 
chain.  
 
The experience of more advanced developing countries shows technology upgrading 
and moving up the value chain involves considerable risk and uncertainty. In a 
context of pervasive market failures in developing countries, technology upgrading 
requires appropriate financial and policy support from government. The key to 
technology upgrading is to address these market failures while also ensuring that 
institutional and governance structures exist to ensure that adverse incentives are not 
created and resources are not wasted.  
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TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING AND MARKET FAILURES  
Technological upgrading in developing countries is potentially subject to serious 
market failures. In the 1960s and 1970s, states tried to address these difficulties by 
introducing protection for infant industries and many types of subsidies to accelerate 
technology acquisition in modern industries. Unfortunately, these attempts to address 
market failures sometimes led to even more serious government failures and the loss 
of public resources through wasted subsidies and inappropriate regulations. That 
experience made both business and government in developing countries reluctant to 
develop programmes that directly addressed market failures.  
 
Instead, the focus in recent years has been to promote ‘good governance’ and a 
favourable ‘investment climate’ as a way of improving market efficiency in 
developing countries. The idea behind these strategies is to make the market 
sufficiently efficient so that market failures become less serious. If this could be 
achieved, the necessary technological upgrading could happen through the market 
without the necessity of further policy or financial assistance from government. But 
this approach too has been disappointing because it is clear that achievable 
improvements in market efficiency through good governance reforms in developing 
countries are very slowly achieved, too slowly to make an impact on immediate 
growth challenges.  
 
There is therefore an urgent need to develop specific instruments and governance 
capabilities to address critical market failures (Khan 2007). This task is urgent but by 
no means easy. It will require a shared understanding of these problems by business 
associations and concerned sections of government to begin to address them. 
 
The methodology for this study was at the interface of several parallel approaches to 
the problem. First, we looked at the insights that economic theory and cross-country 
evidence give us on the types of market failures that developing countries face in 
achieving technological upgrading. Second, we conducted an in-depth survey of a 
selection of firms, banks and other stakeholders involved in the sector to get a better 
understanding of the processes of upgrading and constraints facing technology 
upgrading. Thirdly, we looked at instruments, particularly financial instruments that 
already exist in Bangladesh that may be starting points in a discussion about the 
instruments and governance capabilities that can be developed to address specific 
problems facing this sector.  
 
By testing theoretical issues against the experiences of entrepreneurs and financiers in 
the field, and then looking at shortcomings in existing instruments that have actually 
attempted to address these problems in Bangladesh and other countries, we identify a 
number of promising areas that policy could address. While we focus on the ready-
made garments industry as an illustration, our approach could be of relevance for the  
wider manufacturing sector in Bangladesh. Figure 1 summarizes the main types of 
market failures that investment in technology upgrading in poor countries faces and 
locates our policy focus against others. 
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1960s and 1970s:  
for infant industries, subsidies and land use 
regulation. But indiscriminate subsidies with 
little compulsion for technology upgrading 
produced poor results
Protectionist strategies
Contemporary Good Governance and 
Investment Climate strategies to make 
markets more efficient and reduce market 
failures. But achievable improvements in 
governance in poor countries are slow and 
are unlikely to have an immediate impact 
New Challenges for Policy:
Pressing need to devise instruments and governance 
capabilities to address specific market failures. (For 
instance, financial instruments to accelerate upgrading, 
targeted support for specific training schemes, land 
agencies specifically tasked with managing the 
relocation and expansion of critical industries)
Critical Market Failures 
Affecting Technology Upgrading 
in Developing Countries
Failures in  slow down 
upgrading investments (not just in 
new machinery but also in 
experimenting with new products, 
machines and factory setups where 
the payback period is uncertain)
risk-sharing
Failures in the 
market for  
constrain labour up-
skilling
training
Failures in  constrain 
land purchases and in turn prevent 
scale economies and contiguous 
expansion               
land markets
Policy Responses
 
 
Figure 1 Market Failures, Technology Upgrading and Policy Responses  
 
Technology upgrading is likely to involve one or more of the following: i) the 
purchase and financing of new machinery, ii) the training of workers and employees 
to effectively use new machinery, new processes or serve new markets with new 
products and iii) investments in ancillary factors and in particular land to enable the 
efficient expansion of production.  
 
The financing of technology upgrading involves some specific problems that are often 
not well recognized. Unlike investment that expands existing production or replicates 
technologies that are well known to the investors, new technologies have an unknown 
payback period. In other words, these investments involve a higher degree of risk and 
uncertainty, and high levels of investment in these areas require the presence of risk-
sharing institutions so that a single investor is not required to assume an excessive 
exposure to a particular investment. The absence of risk-sharing institutions is one of 
the most important constraints to technology upgrading in developing countries.  
 
The first and often the most pressing market failure relates to the problems of 
financing upgrading in a context of risk. Upgrading investments are uncertain because 
it takes time to learn how to use new machines, set them up in the most effective way 
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and most importantly, achieve the optimal alignment and ratios of different machines, 
inventories and processing speeds to achieve the optimal throughput and therefore 
overall productivity for the factory.  
 
The resolution of these problems depends on the nature of financing because 
experimentation with machine setups and ratios of machines in a production line is a 
costly exercise. Firms operating on small margins and without access to risk-sharing 
finance are unlikely to achieve the optimal production scale and machinery mix or 
experiment with different factory setups and therefore achieve optimal productivity on 
their overall operations.  
 
In theory, these financing problems could theoretically be solved if there was an 
efficient market and private financing. An efficient market is defined as a market with 
low transaction costs. This means a market where contract enforcement is cheap and 
effective. In such a market finance could be easily raised for risky investments from 
many small investors, each of whom would be exposed to a relatively small risk. They 
would be willing to invest because their investment and potential returns would be 
assured through watertight contracts. But clearly, in a developing country, this 
process does not happen as fast as it should. This is because markets in developing 
countries are not as efficient as they need to be: contracts are difficult to enforce and 
transaction costs are high. This is shown in Figure 1 as the market failures preventing 
risk-sharing in the financing of technology acquisition.  
 
Risk-sharing is different from the cost of financing. Efficient financial markets should 
evolve instruments for sharing risk between investors with different appetites for risk 
and return. However, if contracting failures and transaction costs prevent these 
institutional arrangements from evolving, the risk burden of upgrading may fall 
excessively on a particular class of investors. Unless these investors happen to have a 
high risk appetite, the result is a market failure which prevents high rates of 
investment. More importantly, this market failure slows down investment in new 
technologies where risks are higher but so are the potential returns.  
 
A second area in which market failures emerge is in the training of workers and 
employees so that more sophisticated machines can be optimally used. It is very 
obvious in Bangladesh that the availability of training in many relatively good 
training institutes does not solve the problem because market failures prevent the 
available training being purchased. Here market failures are related to the fact that the 
social return to training is higher than the private return to the entrepreneur who is 
asked to pay for it, and the result is a low take-up of the available training. This is a 
problem in all countries, and specific policies are required to overcome this market 
failure. The important point is that ensuring the take-up of training is a separate 
problem (related to market failure) from the one of identifying skills shortages and 
making the appropriate training available.  
 
A third market failure that is increasingly constraining manufacturing growth in 
developing countries is the failure in land markets which make it difficult to acquire 
land for new startups or for contiguous expansion. In theory, if land markets overall 
could be made more efficient through good governance reforms, this problem would 
disappear. In reality, developing countries cannot feasibly improve the efficiency of 
land markets fast enough and specific steps are required to address market failures 
 8
affecting land acquisition in high growth sectors. While there is widespread 
recognition of this problem in Bangladesh, with discussions of industrial parks and 
garment villages, little progress is made because the institutional and governance 
capabilities to implement these strategies are absent.  
 
These areas of concern identified by economic theory were tested in our survey where 
we engaged in detailed discussions with a number of players in the garment industry, 
both producers of different products, firms of different sizes and technologies as well 
as a number of banks engaged in financing investments in the industry. Our 
methodology relied on structured discussions to explore the processes through which 
financing, training and land acquisition took place in a variety of firms. The survey 
revealed that while there were clearly many problems facing the industry, the market 
failures we identify are indeed serious and pervasive. Focusing on a number of very 
specific and targeted instruments and governance capabilities that could address at 
least some of these market failures would very likely yield significant benefits.  
 
These market failures are of course well recognized in Bangladesh and elsewhere. 
However, the dominant policy response to these market failures in contemporary 
discussions revolves around attempts to make markets in general more efficient 
through ‘good governance’ reforms. Closely related to this is the strategy of 
improving the investment climate (for instance Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and 
World Bank 2003). The theory is that market efficiency can be increased by 
improving the protection of property rights and improving the enforcement of 
contracts through the rule of law. The protection of property rights and the rule of law 
in turn require the absence of corruption, since corruption subverts property rights and 
the rule of law. Anti-corruption strategies are in turn embedded by improving the 
accountability of government and deepening democracy.  
 
Many of these good governance reforms are desirable for their own sake and the 
achievement of these should be long-term goals for developing countries. But if these 
reforms also succeed in reducing transaction costs in markets, for instance by making 
contract enforcement much easier and information much more symmetric, the effect 
would indeed be to accelerate technology upgrading in the ways economic theory 
predicts.  
 
Unfortunately, all the cross-country evidence suggests that it takes a very long time to 
achieve improvements in the areas that good governance reforms focus on (property 
right stability, contract enforcement across the board, rule of law, corruption, 
accountability of governments). This also applies to the areas where investment 
climate reforms focus (good governance plus infrastructure improvements and 
liberalization of regulatory structures) (Khan 2004, 2005, 2006; Meisel and Aoudia 
2008).  
 
If growth and productivity improvement have to be achieved now we cannot wait till 
after the good governance and investment climate reforms finally succeed in making a 
significant impact on market efficiency. Indeed, since improving governance and the 
quality of infrastructure requires public finances, we could argue that these are not 
going to improve in a sustainable way unless immediate steps to accelerate output and 
productivity are successful. A realistic approach for achieving medium-term 
improvements in technology and investment should focus on governance capacities 
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and infrastructure required for solving immediate constraints that are preventing 
improvements in productivity or stopping moves up the value-chain.  
 
In designing these instruments we have to also learn from the failures of the ambitious 
strategies of intervention through which market failures in developing countries were 
addressed in the 1960s and 1970s. Large-scale and often indiscriminate subsidies to 
infant industries, protection and licensing did not produce the desired results and 
should not be repeated. Feasible strategies of dealing with market failures and 
assisting technological upgrading in Bangladesh and other developing countries 
which have had a poor experience with ambitious strategies should focus on a 
relatively small number of high quality and enforceable instruments and agencies. 
Business associations in the sector and government should be able to jointly monitor 
these limited instruments to ensure that the desired results are achieved.  
 
The most appropriate instruments and governance capabilities that could be developed 
will depend not only on the relevant market failures, but also on the initial conditions 
in terms of existing instruments and governance capabilities. Initial conditions are 
important because it is always easier to build on what exists rather than building 
instruments and capabilities from scratch. Equally, if some policy responses require a 
quality of monitoring and enforcement that is unlikely to be achieved in a specific 
sector, then that is a reason for proceeding with caution or not at all in that particular 
direction.  
 
To initiate a discussion on the directions in which policy instruments may be 
developed, we discuss the types of market failures that technological upgrading faces 
in the Bangladeshi garment sector, the instruments that may be appropriate to address 
some of these failures and the directions in which governance capabilities need to be 
developed if these instruments are to be effective. 
 
In the next section we explore the market failures that were outlined earlier. We then 
describe our survey and the results derived from that exercise. Finally we bring these 
insights together to look at how instruments and governance capabilities could be 
developed in Bangladesh to address these market failures. Whenever relevant we 
identify existing instruments and capacities that could be built on, and which we hope 
the subsequent policy discussion in Bangladesh will indeed build on.  
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MARKET FAILURES IN TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING  
If an economic activity is potentially beneficial or profitable but is not undertaken, 
there is usually some ‘market failure’ which explains the failure by society to capture 
the potential additional wages and profits. Market failures refer to all types of 
institutional and contracting problems that prevent transactions of production or 
exchange. Transactions will only take place when all parties are confident that they 
will be able to capture the benefit that exists in theory. If any party feels that they may 
be unable to capture these potential benefits, there is a potential market failure that 
may prevent the transaction from happening at all.  
 
i) Market failures in Financing and Sharing Risk in Technology Upgrading 
Investments 
Financing investment is subject to market failure because the providers of finance are 
typically not in direct control of the firm. Nevertheless, their return depends on the 
effort of those in direct control of the firm. If external financiers are not sure that they 
can capture a fair return, they may either not lend, or lend at a high price, or on 
conditions that shift all the risk to the owners of the firm who may then in turn be 
unwilling to invest.  
 
When investments are being undertaken in new areas where new competences have to 
be developed, the payback period is subject to higher levels of uncertainty, and there 
is a greater chance that some or all of the money may occasionally be lost despite the 
efforts of the entrepreneur. If there are no risk-sharing institutions, a single investor, 
typically the owner-entrepreneur controlling the firm, has to absorb all the risk, for 
instance by the owner pledging personal collateral to get a loan that finances the 
investment.  
 
In these circumstances, the owner-entrepreneur will hesitate to invest in these risky 
upgrading projects because even if they put in their full effort, there is a chance of 
failure that an individual would not like to confront. The loss may amount to a 
significant part of the owner’s portfolio, and the risk of loss would typically be too big 
for most individuals. Thus, risky investments are much more likely to be undertaken 
if a number of investors agree to share the risk of the investment, with the promise of 
a higher return for external investors if the investment is successful.  
 
In theory, if both risk and return could be shared with outside investors (either in the 
form of shareholdings or partnership), this would allow more investments to take 
place in new and more risky areas. The risk would be shared, reducing the exposure 
of any individual investor. The precise formula for sharing risk and return can be 
expected to vary from case to case depending on the appetites for risk of different 
classes of investors and the riskiness of the investment.  
 
The problem is that outside shareholders will only agree to a risk and reward sharing 
agreement if they are confident that they will actually get an agreed-upon share of 
future profits. In particular, they have to be assured of disclosure so that insiders 
cannot hide profits while declaring losses.  
 
Accurate disclosure is very hard to ensure even in advanced countries, and even 
reasonable disclosure is often not credible in most developing countries. Not 
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surprisingly, venture capitalist type financing of risky ventures is much less in 
evidence in developing countries. Where stock markets exist in developing countries, 
traded firms are likely to be very large companies with an already strong reputation 
for profitability rather than newcomers raising money for investment in new 
technologies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
 
The difficulties of disclosure and enforcement also explain why most firms in 
developing countries are relatively small and family owned, and the ones with the 
least internal conflicts are the ones where one individual controls and owns most of 
the firm. Thus, adequate disclosure appears often to be difficult to enforce even within 
the family or a small group of partners in developing countries.  
 
Institutional mechanisms for financing investment
Developmental Banking: Banks 
and/or government absorb some 
of the risk of investment in new 
technologies to counter market 
failures
Focus on clearly defined financial instruments with a narrow investment remit 
that can be monitored and enforced. Profit and risk sharing instruments 
already present in Bangladesh include several Islamic banking instruments 
and the government’s Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund. The challenge is to 
develop these types of instruments to address risk-based market failures and 
develop governance capabilities required for their effective implementation
Shareholding/
Partnership
Risk sharing more likely 
allowing technology 
upgrading investments
Route blocked as the 
main path towards rapid 
technical progress
The pragmatic 
governance 
challenge is to 
develop narrowly 
defined institutional 
capabilities to 
operate a few 
critical instruments
Bank-based lending
Traditional Banking: 
Borrowers take most of 
the risk and interest rates 
also typically high in 
developing countries
But market failures 
because of poor contract 
enforcement and 
disclosure
Market failures 
because borrowers 
cannot share risk
Effective for low-risk 
growth through 
replication but 
technology 
acquisition in new 
areas is slow
But poor governance 
capabilities for monitoring and 
enforcing lending conditions to 
protect banks
Good Governance Reforms aim 
to improve these conditions to 
allow stock markets and other 
private financing but progress in 
implementing good governance 
is likely to be very slow 
Ambitious industrial 
lending strategies (1960s-
1970s) fail because poor 
monitoring and 
enforcement result in 
large non-performing 
loans
 
Figure 2 Market failures in risk-sharing and financing of technology acquisition  
 
These realities are unlikely to change very rapidly, though we can expect a gradual 
development of corporate structures over a period of decades. However, effective 
corporate governance requires an effective public enforcement of regulatory rules 
such as rules of disclosure and the enforcement of the rights of outside investors (such 
as shareholders or financial partners). But these enforcement capacities and regulatory 
structures are expensive to attain and enforce and difficult to fine tune.  
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Advanced countries have reached their current situation through a very gradual 
process of development of regulatory capacities and the fine tuning of their corporate 
governance structures continues all the time. The realistic assessment must be that 
developing countries like Bangladesh have a long way to go before their regulatory 
structures and the general rule of law will be sufficiently strong to allow significant 
financing of technological upgrading by venture capitalists, shareholders or outside 
financial partners.  
 
We should also remember that even in advanced countries bank finance and internal 
financing from reinvested profits remain important sources of financing for firms. In 
developing countries the relatively small size of firms and the low productivity of 
emerging manufacturing means that profits cannot be a significant source of finance 
for technology upgrading in most firms. The immediate problem is therefore to take 
these structural features as given realities for the moment and see if feasible and 
pragmatic financial instruments can be devised that will allow more rapid 
technological upgrading.  
 
Because of the problems of organizing profit sharing arrangements in developing 
countries (whether through partners or shareholders), banks have historically played a 
much more important role in financing development in these contexts. However, bank 
lending is itself likely to face market failures. First, banks too face problems of poor 
disclosure and recovery, and this often leads to excessively high rates of interest as 
banks try to compensate for a higher percentage of bad loans by raising the average 
interest rate. However, this can be a potentially self-defeating exercise because high 
interest rates can begin to attract only those borrowers who are least likely to repay 
because they have excessively ambitious business plans (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  
 
A second problem is that banks also try to protect themselves as much as possible by 
requiring high quality collateral from borrowers. This effectively passes most if not 
all of the risk of the investment to the owner-entrepreneur borrowing from the bank. 
This can clearly discourage investments in new sectors and technologies because the 
typical borrowers in a developing country are relatively small investors who would 
risk the loss of too large a part of their individual portfolio if a particular upgrading 
investment failed to pay off. Thus collateral backed loans can have a dampening 
effect on investments in new technologies unless policies exist to ensure that 
investments in new technologies are not discouraged (Hellman, et al. 1997).  
 
It follows that traditional lending based on borrowers putting up collateral and paying 
a predetermined return will generally be most effective for financing short-term 
financial requirements of firms and the replication of known technologies that have 
relatively low risk. Firms will be more reluctant to take up loans for investing in 
newer and riskier technologies since entrepreneurs are unable to assess in advance 
how long it may take them to generate a positive return on the new investment. With a 
fixed interest loan, a small miscalculation of the period it will take to achieve 
international competitiveness can make a project unviable through the accumulation 
of interest, leading to a potential default and the threat of a possible loss of collateral.  
 
It is not that risky investments do not happen with bank loans. They do, but they are 
less common and depend on risk-taking entrepreneurs coming forward. Clearly, 
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entrepreneurs who are sole proprietors will only take loans for technology upgrading 
if they are sure that the technology can pay off in a relatively short period. This 
explains the widespread observation that traditional bank lending can support a rapid 
horizontal expansion based on the replication of known technologies but is relatively 
slow to support vertical moves into unknown technologies which can take an 
unknown length of time to master and where progress is likely to be slow.  
 
These problems with bank-based industrialization in developing countries are well 
known and historically states have tried to overcome these market failures with policy 
interventions to reduce the risk for investors whose only source of financing was a 
bank. For instance, developing country states often have specific policies that create 
incentives for banks to lend long-term for technical upgrading while reducing the 
interest rate and therefore the risk for investors engaged in technology upgrading 
(Hellman, et al. 1997). But if effective subsidies are being offered, developmental 
banking of this type also requires backing from the state to enforce the repayment of 
loans after all efforts to improve the viability of a project have failed.  
 
As Figure 2 summarizes, when states without effective governance capabilities 
attempted to engage in long-term developmental banking, the results were often poor. 
Indeed, Bangladesh still has a problem with non-performing loans in its public sector 
banks which are mainly the result of badly managed long-term lending to industry in 
the past. The challenge is clearly to address the market failures that constrain effective 
long-term lending and risk sharing without repeating these mistakes of providing 
indiscriminate subsidies without any monitoring capacity or the capacity to withdraw 
capital from non-performers.  
 
Financial instruments targeted to technology upgrading in these contexts have to be 
designed by taking into account the governance capabilities of the institutions 
monitoring and enforcing the conditions attached to these instruments. To overcome 
the market failure here, the instrument has to address two problems. On the one hand 
lenders have to be protected in a context of poor contract enforcement. On the other 
hand, financing has to be available for borrowers that does not cost too much, and 
does not put all the risk on the borrower (for instance through excessive collateral 
coverage of the loan). The optimal institutional arrangement in these contexts would 
be a lending regime where banks as lenders have policy incentives to engage in a 
small amount of long-term lending for technology upgrading.  
 
Government policy is important here because lending for technology upgrading is 
very sensitive to interest rates and the implicit sharing of risks between the owners of 
the firm and others. Interest rates have to be low enough to induce borrowers to 
borrow for projects whose payback period is uncertain and there have to be 
institutional mechanisms of sharing the risk of delays so that the borrower is not 
wiped out if there are unforeseen delays in an otherwise sound project.  
 
This does not mean that the external financier has to take on all the risk. Indeed, some 
exposure of the owner-entrepreneur borrowing the money, through collateral or 
otherwise is desirable because it can help to induce a high level of effort on the part of 
the entrepreneur. But the entrepreneur’s exposure should not be so high that if the 
project fails despite the best efforts of the entrepreneur the consequences are 
unacceptably severe. This is because the entrepreneur is very likely to refuse to accept 
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such a high level of risk and this is a cost for society because potentially important 
investments will not be undertaken. Another way of putting it is that for critical 
upgrading investments, it is in society’s interest to share some of the risk with the 
investor.  
 
Clearly for these categories of loans, there is a potential market failure if we rely 
solely on traditional banking. However, if special risk-sharing instruments are devised 
that allow potential investors to access finance at a lower price and risk for specific 
types of new investments, banks and/or the government have to engage in effective 
monitoring of these projects. In particular, support from the state has to be 
forthcoming to assist with capital withdrawal in cases of failure.  
 
The poor design of financing instruments and weak governance capabilities have 
made industrial development loans perform poorly in the past in many developing 
countries. But for developing countries like Bangladesh that have achieved a 
threshold level of manufacturing capability through traditional bank lending, a clear 
policy priority is to develop strong capabilities for managing a narrow range of 
financial instruments that would allow a faster rate of upgrading investments to take 
place in the future.  
 
ii) Market failures in training and upskilling 
One of the paradoxes observed in the labour market in many developing countries is 
that in a context of overall labour surplus there are often serious labour shortages in 
growth sectors. These are ultimately due to skill shortages at all levels of the skills 
profile. The second paradox is that in some of these developing countries (and 
Bangladesh is rapidly joining this group) the problem of skill shortages persists even 
if training institutes emerge. These observations are of course not really paradoxes 
because the market in training is subject to severe market failures, and this prevents 
the take-up of available training in the absence of specific policies to address these 
market failures.  
 
Two types of market failures are particularly relevant here. First, entrepreneurs who 
train labour in new technologies and products face a market failure because if they 
succeed in creating new profitable opportunities, other entrepreneurs will emulate 
them, and they will bid away the skilled labour in the initial firms with offers of 
slightly higher wages which are feasible for them because they have not invested in 
their training. This can lead to a dampening of investment in training, particularly in 
new skills and in the learning of new technologies. This market failure leads to 
entrepreneurs preferring to wait for other entrepreneurs to identify new profitable 
technologies and then copying them, rather than incurring the costs and risks of being 
the first mover.  
 
A second market failure affecting training and skill acquisition is the market failure in 
financing risk that we have already seen. This too affects the financing of training 
because entrepreneurs are often justifiably reluctant to borrow at high interest rates 
and with collateral commitments to engage in risky training exercises where the 
period of repayment cannot be predicted in advance for new technologies. The result 
of these market failures in the market for labour training means that the take-up of 
training can be limited even when relatively high quality training is available at 
competitive prices. Firms will prefer to undertake in-house on-the-job training, and 
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finance this with lower wages for the workers undertaking the training. This strategy 
may be appropriate for very basic training programmes, but it has its limitations when 
the training required is for new processes, machines or products, which by definition 
are not yet in operation in the firm.  
 
Entrepreneur financing training may not be 
able to capture a fair return because 
trained labour can leave for other firms: 
This market failure is acute for new 
technologies where the first firms are likely 
to lose skilled workers as others emulate 
their technology once it proves successful
Entrepreneur financing training in new 
technologies also faces uncertain return 
because the time required to achieve 
international competitiveness is not known 
in advance: this is the risk-sharing market 
failure discussed earlier affecting (in this 
case) investment in human capital
Under-investment in training even when it is 
available at a competitive market price. Firms 
prefer to limit themselves to on-the-job training 
financed by low wages/salaries during training 
period, but this is particularly limiting for 
upgrading into new products and technologies  
Figure 3 Market failures in labour training and upskilling  
 
The appropriate policy responses here are very similar to the ones appropriate for 
dealing with absent risk-sharing institutions. Carefully targeted subsidies (for 
privately provided training programmes) or subsidized training schemes (for 
government programmes) could assist the take-up of training. But as with the 
responses for sharing risk, strong governance capabilities are required in these clearly 
defined areas to ensure that the quality of training is monitored and accredited, that 
poor training providers or unscrupulous employers do not capture the subsidies 
without providing the training.  
 
Indiscriminate subsidies can do more harm than good by creating distorted incentives 
for training in inappropriate skills. It is also important to conserve limited public 
resources by only targeting training in sectors that are subject to market failures. 
Training in established technologies where the market failures we have been 
discussing do not apply typically does not need any training subsidies.  
 
iii) Market failures in Land Markets 
Land markets in developing countries are characterized by a number of significant 
market failures. Landholdings in many developing countries are typically very small, 
they typically do not have clearly defined title and in many cases, title is disputed 
between multiple claimants, each of whom may have some documentation supporting 
their claims.  
 
As a result, land purchases are a prolonged and costly exercise, and in some cases, it 
may prove impossible for entrepreneurs who want to expand their scale of operation 
to purchase contiguous plots of land near infrastructural amenities. This is sometimes 
because no free land is available, but is more often because the transaction costs of 
purchasing the available land are too high. As a result of these types of problems, 
many manufacturing operations in countries like Bangladesh are in unauthorized 
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locations where their future is uncertain, and where they face serious constraints on 
further expansion.  
 
As Figure 4 summarize, these market failures are widely recognized and as a result 
developing countries have historically attempted to make land available for industry 
through government policy interventions. However, industrial zones are often 
designated far away from infrastructural amenities, and governance capacities for 
providing land to emerging industries are often poor regardless of legal provisions. In 
contrast to the actual performance of government policies, addressing these market 
failures requires the provision of land for designated economic purposes, which is 
relatively well-connected to critical infrastructural amenities and transport networks.  
 
Conventional policies of industrial land 
allocation, industrial parks and accelerated 
infrastructure provision for industry poorly 
implemented. Current preference for good 
governance reforms to make the land 
market more efficient also unlikely to have 
any immediate impact. Pressing policy need 
to develop governance capabilities in a few 
agencies tasked with delivering land and 
infrastructure to critical sectors
Political consensus on the 
importance of addressing these 
land market constraints is vital in 
land-scarce countries. As 
industrialization proceeds, conflicts 
over land use likely to become 
more intense. Critical need to 
develop fair policies of acquisition 
and compensation that are 
politically supported
Unplanned growth of factories, often in 
unauthorized locations: Expansion to achieve 
scale economies very costly, the same 
entrepreneur can have several disconnected 
plants losing economies of scale, clustering 
and locational economies difficult to achieve
Market failures in land serious because of 
high transaction costs of purchasing 
contiguous land plots: Land rights are 
conflicting, multiple claimants often exist, 
resolution of disputes in courts is prolonged 
and prior landholdings are small requiring 
multiple purchases by industrialists
These problems are exacerbated if land is 
very scarce: access to land and the 
policies of government can become deeply 
divisive politically. Growing land conflicts in 
India (as in Nandigram) demonstrate the 
importance of planning and creating 
advance political support for industry
 
Figure 4 Market failures in the land market 
 
The failure of land policies for industrialization can in turn prevent the development 
of scale economies and clustering advantages. At the same time, the non-availability 
of land for industrial development close to good infrastructural amenities often leads 
to unplanned and illegal developments within urban centres. The problem is that 
effective land policies are very difficult to implement. In practice, strategies of 
constructing industrial zones often result in inaction, with policy announcements that 
are not followed up, or in the construction of industrial zones that are so far away 
from industrial hubs and infrastructure that the take-up of the available land is very 
slow. The worst outcome is the mismanagement of the land acquisition and allocation 
process leading to violence, deaths and a general setback to land management for 
industrialization.  
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An example of the costs of mismanagement comes from neighbouring India whose 
recent experience shows that land scarcity is likely to become an important constraint 
on industrial expansion. Bangladesh is in many respects of land use similar to West 
Bengal which has recently faced serious conflicts as a result of the mishandling of 
land acquisition and allocation. This is particularly instructive because the party 
responsible for the mishandling was the politically rooted and adroit CPM. The 
Nandigram and Singur crises in West Bengal over 2006 and 2007 were the result of 
poor strategies and governance capabilities for handling conflicts over land 
acquisition. Attempts by the state government to acquire land through compulsory 
purchase orders resulted in organized political opposition leading to violence in which 
a number of people were killed. The land acquisition questions that have been raised 
(but not yet answered) in West Bengal and a number of other Indian states are likely 
to soon surface in Bangladesh. 
 
In the conventional governance approach the solution to these problems is to improve 
the land market as a whole by improving land records, the court system and fighting 
corruption, so that land market transactions can take place smoothly. Our general 
concern with the good governance approach is repeated here. By itself these strategies 
will not solve the problem faced by industry any time soon. In contrast, we require 
incremental growth-promoting governance capabilities on the part of the state to 
identify specific land bottlenecks and develop moderately efficient agencies to 
address land use problems on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The urgent policy priority must therefore be to address the governance weaknesses 
that have prevented the implementation of land management policies. A feasible way 
to proceed would be to focus on a much more limited set of land management issues, 
in particular by focusing on national priorities for manufacturing growth. For 
instance, one approach would be to focus on the administrative and political 
capacities required to set up industrial parks for priority industries, and to prioritize 
infrastructure to these critical industrial zones.  
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THE SURVEY AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION  
The market failures identified above were based on a reading of the international 
experience with technology upgrading in developing countries. To examine the extent 
to which these problems affected different segments of the Bangladeshi garment 
industry and the mechanisms through which these market failures operated we carried 
out in-depth interviews with a sample of firms, banks, training institutes and donor 
agencies associated with technology acquisition.  
 
The aim of these interviews was not to collect numerical data but rather to understand 
processes, and so it was important for us to include different types of firm by size, 
technology, employee and capital base, and to include firms in different segments of 
the garment business such as those engaged in wovens, in knitwear, in the production 
of accessories and other linkages including dyeing, weaving and other significant 
backward and forward linkages. It was also important for us to understand the 
constraints faced by financiers, in particular banks in financing technology upgrading. 
We also wanted to incorporate the experiences of agencies involved in trying to 
promote technology upgrading, including in particular government agencies, donor 
agencies, and private training agencies.  
 
We included representatives of each of these types of stakeholders in our sample. We 
did not need to achieve a representative sample proportion of each type of firm and 
technology as this was not important for understanding processes. This was perhaps 
fortunate because accurate figures on the distribution of different firm sizes, 
technologies and products in the rapidly evolving industry were not available. 
Nevertheless, to ensure that we had looked at all important sub-sectors and 
technologies, we consulted available surveys on the emerging structure of the garment 
industry in Bangladesh (Kee 2005; World Bank 2005; PPMA 2006; CPD 2007).  
 
We selected our interviewees to cover different sizes and technologies of domestic 
firms, including those that had foreign partnerships, but we excluded firms that were 
primarily set up through foreign direct investment (FDI). The last group of firms 
constitute a very small part of the total and were outside our remit because they are 
subject to different financing arrangements and have access to a different set of 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills.  
 
According to Kee’s (2005) survey, less than 15% of Bangladeshi garment firms have 
foreign equity, and the number where foreign equity is dominant are even fewer. Not 
surprisingly, Kee finds that productivity in foreign firms in the Bangladeshi garment 
sector is on average 20% higher than in domestic firms. Kee suggests that a possible 
explanation for the productivity difference is the access of foreign firms to superior 
management and technical know-how. FDI financed firms by definition have access 
to a specific type of financing and typically operate on a larger scale that is likely to 
be closer to the minimum efficient scale of operation. While these firms are also 
likely to face market failures, they are likely to be different from the ones affecting 
domestic firms that are reliant on domestic financing and skill acquisition strategies 
and have to rely entirely on the local land market for acquiring land for expansion.  
 
FDI firms have alternative sources of financing that allow them to overcome the first 
two constraints to a greater extent than domestic firms, and they also suffer from land 
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acquisition problems to a lesser extent because they are located in export processing 
zones (EPZs) where land acquisition and infrastructure problems are much less severe 
than elsewhere. For these reasons, we excluded the small group of FDI based firms 
from our survey. However, Kee’s observations regarding the statistically superior 
productivity of FDI firms are consistent with our hypothesis that domestic firms suffer 
from (more) serious market failures in financing the purchase of machines, financing 
and organizing labour upskilling and in land acquisition that could together explain 
their lower productivity and competitiveness.  
 
The lost opportunities for the domestic sector are probably much greater than the 20% 
productivity differential with FDI-based firms observed by Kee. This is because 
market failures may not only be preventing domestic firms from achieving the full 
potential of their existing technologies as implemented by foreign firms, they may 
also be slowing down moves into higher valued products and processes that are higher 
up the value chain.  
 
Our survey was based on in-depth interviews with industry participants around a set 
of questions exploring how the three market failures described above affected their 
businesses, the ways in which they had responded to these constraints, and their 
assessment of alternative policy solutions that may address these market failures in 
the future. As these market failures affected different firms and types of firms in 
different ways, we engaged in open-ended discussions with each interviewee and 
eventually focused on the market failures that were perceived by each to be most 
relevant for their business.  
 
This approach allowed us to develop at length the issues that most affected a 
particular respondent but it also precluded the use of a standard predetermined 
questionnaire for all firms. We believe the qualitative approach followed in this 
research yielded more useful information than might have been generated by a 
standardized questionnaire sent to a larger number of firms.  
  
The survey consisted of in-depth interviews with the owners of 36 plants operating in 
different segments of the industry, and with key personnel in two commercial banks 
with significant exposure to the industry, the Bangladesh Bank, two donor 
organizations involved in technology upgrading in Bangladeshi manufacturing, and a 
private sector training organization involved in providing fee-based training to the 
garment industry. When required, the initial interviews were followed by further 
discussions and visits to the plants involved. The interviewees are listed in an 
Appendix to this document.  
 
We found significant common elements in the experiences of different firms and sub-
sectors, but with obvious differences in the types of problems that affected different 
firms depending on their size and the types of technologies they used. These initial 
interviews were processed and a number of broad conclusions emerged that were then 
further discussed in a stakeholder conference where interviewees and other 
stakeholders made further comments on the initial report.  
 
One of the unexpected findings of our survey that was interesting in itself was the 
initial responses of entrepreneurs, bankers and others to questions about constraints 
facing them. These initial responses were most likely to replicate the conventional 
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good governance wisdom to which most of our respondents had been extensively 
exposed. In other words, many respondents immediately identified the importance of 
good governance reforms and general issues of infrastructure, power constraints, 
delays at ports and cumbersome regulations as the most critical constraints for 
technology upgrading. This is because of the dominance of the good governance 
programme in Bangladesh and the diverse constituencies which support it, together 
with widespread publicity for the investment climate approach (Bangladesh 
Enterprise Institute and World Bank 2003).  
 
The infrastructural constraints are indeed serious and urgent steps need to be taken to 
address these. These infrastructural constraints are well known and do not require 
another study to identify or highlight them. When the industry was small, 
infrastructural constraints did not stop the garment sector in Bangladesh growing at a 
rapid rate in the past. The volume that it has now reached has begun to seriously strain 
the infrastructure and it desperately requires improvements in power supply, transport 
networks and ports to enable the momentum to keep going.  
 
However, from the perspective of this study, it is not at all clear how or why 
overcoming the infrastructural constraints, important as they are, will not simply 
allow the volume of low value-added exports to expand further, as opposed to helping 
technology upgrading into higher value products or help firms to achieve international 
standards of productivity using their existing technologies.  
 
In contrast, the good governance agenda as applied to the technology upgrading 
discussion is seriously misleading for the reasons discussed earlier and summarized in 
Figure 1. The mechanisms through which good governance is being attempted are not 
likely to deliver quick results in developing countries. Moreover, the impact of the 
limited improvements that are likely on market efficiency is in turn unlikely to make 
any significant impact on the market failures we are discussing.  
 
When our survey participants were confronted with likely mechanisms through which 
good governance reforms were likely to solve their problems (for instance through 
making stock markets more efficient and allowing them to raise funds from the stock 
market) they universally agreed that these conventional mechanisms were implausible 
even in the medium term. This makes the search for feasible governance reforms that 
can make an impact on economic performance and technology upgrading very urgent.  
 
In the subsequent sections we describe the main results of our survey and possible 
policy responses to the problems identified in the three categories of constraints that 
constitute the focus of this study: financing investment and technology upgrading, 
skills and training, and land market failures. In summarizing our findings we have for 
obvious reasons not attributed particular positions or opinions to individual 
respondents. 
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FINANCING INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING  
The main survey findings and policy proposals are summarized in Figure 5. Many of 
the findings strongly support the importance of the theoretical concerns summarized 
in Figure 2.  
 
KEY SURVEY FINDINGS ON THE FINANCING OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING
i) Traditional Bank Finance is the dominant form of external financing
ii) Bank Finance is readily available
iii) But relatively high interest rates and significant exposure of owner’s collateral
iv) Virtually no institutional mechanisms for sharing risks involved in upgrading
v) Investors prefer to rely on own financing, reinvested profits, and foreign partnerships
vi)  New entrants face much harder constraints in accessing bank finance
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
i) Developing stock markets is not a realistic immediate solution
ii) Developing or modifying existing financial instruments that share risk is more feasible. 
Existing instruments include the government’s Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund 
(but currently only available for other economic sectors and there is a need to address 
weaknesses in design by identifying simpler ways of achieving a fair return for equity 
holders and a simpler formula for determining the buyback price)
iii) Islamic banking instruments can also be modified in the same way to achieve genuine 
risk and profit sharing to allow upgrading investments to be financed 
(by addressing the problem of under-disclosure of profits by linking profits to easily-
observed indicators like exports)
iv) Direct government subsidies can reduce the risk and cost of upgrading 
(adapting a version of the Indian textile sector Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme but 
with greater effort in targeting and monitoring of funds)
v) Government/Donor subsidies can reduce the setup costs of foreign partners, technology 
providers, and financiers 
(scaling up Danish B2B programme but requires setting targets and monitoring results)
 
Figure 5 Survey Findings and Policy Proposals for Financing Upgrading 
 
Traditional Bank Lending is the dominant form of external financing  
The only significant form of external financing reported by our respondents was bank 
financing. This was not at all surprising because disclosure is difficult to enforce and 
the rights of outside investors are difficult to protect in a developing economy. As a 
result we expect stock markets to be underdeveloped and partnerships difficult to 
operate. None of our firms had raised funds in the stock market and a number reported 
serious difficulties with partnership arrangements.  
 
The bulk of external financing came from the commercial banks, though there were a 
small number of cases of external financing from foreign partners, which we will 
discuss later. One of our surveyed entrepreneurs reminded us that a number of banks 
had played a pioneering role in the early history of the industry, sometimes lending 
with little or no collateral cover. Two of the banks frequently named in these 
discussions as critical players in the development of the industry were included in our 
survey. Despite the important role banks played as pioneers in the industry and their 
continued dominance as outside investors, other aspects of the responses of our 
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respondents suggest that the lending instruments currently available to banks are not 
sufficient for addressing the major financing challenges faced by the industry. 
 
Bank Finance is readily available in the sector  
The problem is not the absolute availability of finance. Our survey revealed that bank 
finance is readily available for established technologies and entrepreneurs (when both 
sides are confident that the loan can be repaid over a short period). This observation 
was consistent with the observation of rapid growth in the ready-made garments 
sector which has been heavily reliant on bank lending.  
 
This suggests that in an absolute sense, there is no scarcity of investment funds in 
Bangladesh, particularly for investors in growth sectors like the ready-made garments 
industry. This was confirmed both by the banks and firms that we surveyed. If 
anything, at the time of our survey, banks wanted to lend more and lending appeared 
to be constrained by the risk aversion of borrowers. Borrowers corroborated this.  
 
Relatively high interest rates and significant exposure of owner’s collateral  
While there was no absolute shortage of funds, a common concern amongst borrowers 
was the generally high levels of interest rates even for loans backed by good 
collateral. Most firms reported interest rates in a range between 16-18% for relatively 
safe loans backed by good collateral, and for entrepreneurs with a strong track record. 
A common formula would be a loan covered to the extent of 30-40% by owner’s 
collateral and the rest by machinery and order books. Even if such a project failed, the 
exposure of the bank was effectively negligible.  
 
High interest rates were attributed by banks to the implicitly high risk premium on 
these loans. As the risk premium cannot be objectively measured and is dependent on 
market conditions, we can take this as given for the time being. The only way to test if 
the risk premium is excessive would be through competition and the entry of new 
banks into the sector.  
 
Virtually no institutional mechanisms for sharing risks involved in upgrading 
This was our most critical survey finding, which corroborates theoretical expectations 
and the cross-country evidence from LDCs. Even more important than the relatively 
high level of the interest rate is the absence of financing instruments that enable any 
significant sharing of risk for firms engaged in risky technology upgrading projects. 
Bank loans are the main form of external financing in the sector.  
 
A bank loan imposes a fixed periodic interest liability on the borrower that has to be 
covered regardless of the profitability achieved by the firm. This effectively shifts the 
risk of delays and problems in implementation of new technologies on to the 
borrower. Clearly, as some firms pointed out, banks do sometimes act on an ad hoc 
basis to mitigate the risks faced by firms. For instance, banks can show flexibility in 
negotiating collateral requirements and in rescheduling debts. But understandably, 
they are only likely to be flexible with a few firms and entrepreneurs they know and 
trust. There was clearly an absence of institutionalized instruments that allow a 
sharing of risk in ways that could accelerate technology acquisition.  
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The problem is that this financing instrument therefore implicitly limits the types of 
technologies that firms are likely to be willing to adopt. To seek external finance in 
the form of a bank loan, the borrowing firm has to have a fairly confident forecast of 
how long it will take for the investment to become profitable. This will depend on how 
long it takes the firm to learn to use new technologies, develop new markets or adapt 
its factory setup to achieve the greatest efficiency and price competitiveness.  
 
The more unfamiliar the new technology is, the more difficult it is for the firm to 
predict its learning period accurately. In contrast, it is easier to predict the learning 
time if the technology being acquired is known to the borrower, or is similar to 
technologies already being used. The firm can then relatively confidently calculate its 
prospective net profitability over the life of the loan and decide to accept or reject a 
loan offer.  
 
The critical problem for technology upgrading is that this technology is by definition 
likely to be new to the firm. It can then only make a rough calculation of the 
implementation and learning period required to make the investment generate a net 
cash flow that is positive. A relatively small misjudgement of the period of learning 
by the firm could turn a potentially profitable investment into a potential disaster. 
Hitches in the process of learning and adaptation could easily delay the adoption of a 
technology and delay the generation of profits. The rolling over of interest payments 
during this period could then easily make the debt burden unmanageable.  
 
It is not often appreciated that learning to use new technologies and adapting them to 
local conditions is just as risky and uncertain an exercise as innovation in advanced 
countries. Just as few innovators in advanced countries would take an interest-bearing 
bank loan to finance a process of innovation whose period of payback cannot be 
foretold, we should expect few investors in new technologies in developing countries 
will be willing to take a fixed interest loan to finance an equivalent process of 
innovation through learning and adaptation.  
 
The responses of our interviewees confirm the theoretical expectation about 
traditional bank lending summarized in Figure 2. Traditional bank lending in 
Bangladesh did allow (and will allow in the future) the rapid expansion of productive 
capacity as long as the risks are low enough for the borrower to accept this risk. But 
where the risk (in the sense of uncertainty about the period of learning) is significant, 
firms will be unwilling to borrow if they are expected to absorb this risk in its 
entirety.  
 
The risk sharing problem is exacerbated because most firms in the garment industry in 
Bangladesh are relatively small family firms with a dominant owner-manager. This 
means that risk usually cannot be shared within the firm by multiple stakeholders in 
the form of shareholders or partners. Effectively a single individual is typically 
accepting the risk single-handedly. Despite differences in their ownership forms, 
virtually all the firms in our sample had a clearly identifiable dominant owner who 
was typically also engaged in a dominant position in management. Given what we 
have said earlier about the enforcement of the rights of minority shareholders and 
partners, this was not a surprising finding.  
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Investors prefer to rely on own financing, reinvested profits, and occasionally 
foreign partnerships for financing risky investments  
While bank loans remain important for many firms, our discussions with 
entrepreneurs also brought out a parallel reality. Investments in more risky expansion 
projects, in scaling up, and particularly in new technologies, products and processes 
was slowed down because of the absence of risk sharing instruments. Under these 
circumstances, we found several different patterns of financing for technology 
upgrading in our surveyed firms.  
 
For firms that relied primarily on bank loans for their continued expansion, the 
expansion and technology upgrading was most likely to happen in an incremental 
way. Firms were likely to adopt technologies closely related to ones they were 
familiar with. Here, although firms were exposed to risk, their exposure was reduced 
by focusing on incremental technology acquisition and sticking with technologies 
they were already familiar with. This is what we would expect because this strategy 
would at least reduce the chances of miscalculating the period of adoption that could 
result in an unserviceable debt burden.  
 
However, even when the risk of failure was low, there was always some uncertainty 
about how long the adoption and adaptation of the new technology would take, even 
with incremental technology upgrading. With high interest rates and significant owner 
collateral tied up, for many borrowers, bank borrowing appeared to them to leverage 
their risk upwards. An unexpected delay could happen even with known and safe 
technologies, and a relatively small delay could make projects unsustainable because 
of rolled up interest. Thus, even for safe technologies, most of our respondent firms 
preferred to use internal financing such as owner’s capital or retained profits. Some 
firms expressed a strong antipathy to any form of bank-based financing for expansion 
even using known technologies on the grounds that the high interest rates and 
collateral made the risk-return ratio for the firm unacceptable.  
 
Three of the most ambitious technology upgrading firms in our sample were investing 
with non-bank finance that they had access to. In two cases it was a combination of 
owner capital and reinvested profits. These (and other) entrepreneurs pointed out that 
they would not take the risk of moving into significant new technologies using fixed 
interest loans.  
 
Another method of financing significant investments in new technologies was through 
foreign partnerships. This was particularly interesting because a number of 
respondents reported serious difficulties with local partnerships. Partnerships with 
local financiers typically did not survive. Surviving partnerships in our surveyed firms 
were those where partners were members of an extended family with a dominant 
partner effectively operating as the owner-manager. However, we found examples of 
partnerships with foreign partners both for major investment and upgrading 
programmes, in one case assisted by the Danish B2B programme (discussed later 
below) as well as for a relatively small firm, where the tie-up with a foreign financial 
partner was based on a more accidental relationship. In both cases, the foreign 
partnership appeared to be working well for reasons very specific to the particular 
relationships and not related to the general disclosure and enforcement conditions in 
the economy.  
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The point is that all these forms of non-bank financing were based on special 
circumstances of the entrepreneurs concerned. These special circumstances could be 
their access to significant own resources, or access to a special relationship with a 
foreign partner. For the industry as a whole, the absence of a range of institutionalized 
risk-sharing financing instruments must surely be contributing to the slow pace of 
technology upgrading and the slow movement into new products and processes higher 
up the value chain. 
 
In general, therefore, our survey confirmed the hypothesis that bank-based finance in 
the form in which it is available, while allowing rapid expansion in already existent 
technologies, did have important limitations for technology upgrading and risk 
sharing. This is consistent with the limitations of the traditional banking route 
identified in Figure 2. Borrowers with a strong track record were engaging in bank 
borrowing but would only borrow if they were confident the technology would enable 
profitable production within a relatively short period, usually 6 to 18 months. Most 
borrowers we surveyed would only consider loans that could be repaid within two to 
three years.  
 
New entrants face much harder constraints in accessing bank finance 
While established firms and entrepreneurs felt that bank financing was too expensive 
and transferred most of the risk to them, new entrants found it difficult to access bank 
loans under any conditions. In many cases, even a long exposure to business in the 
sector as managers or in other capacities did not necessarily make potential entrants 
bankable. Apart from the usual collateral requirements, banks also wanted an 
entrepreneurial track record, which by definition new entrants did not have.  
 
This problem is closely related to banks wanting to reduce their exposure to risk. 
When the industry was in its infancy and banks were dealing with and promoting a 
handful of entrepreneurs, they were more likely to take risks with new entrants 
because the potential new entrants were personally known to the banks. This strategy 
is no longer adequate with a sector of its current size. While the risk aversion of banks 
is perfectly understandable from the perspective of banks, the implications for 
industrial expansion are also clear. Once again, the absence of risk sharing institutions 
is an important part of the problem. 
 
An interesting result of our survey was that some of the biggest entrepreneurs in our 
sample had developed their entrepreneurial expertise in an earlier period when they 
had access to longer term and subsidized loans available from the industrial 
development banks. The industrial development banks had served as vital instruments 
for accelerating new entry and for developing entrepreneurial skills in a group of early 
industrialists who were later at the forefront of bigger investments. But their exposure 
to business had developed on the experience they had acquired through their initial 
enterprises. For these early entrepreneurs, the access to industrial development loans 
had provided opportunities for learning new technologies and business skills at 
relatively low risk.  
 
These technical and entrepreneurial skills provided an essential base for their future 
expansion. For all the shortcomings of the developmental banking approach 
(discussed earlier) the development banks provided opportunities for risk sharing that 
had accelerated new entry and the development of entrepreneurial skills at a time 
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when these were in short supply. The absence of industrial development banks in the 
contemporary financing landscape is a critical difference from the earlier period. Risk 
sharing institutions can clearly assist both the acceleration of technology acquisition 
by already existing entrepreneurs as well as assisting the creation of new 
entrepreneurs who can grow to become the big entrepreneurs of tomorrow. 
 
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES TO ADDRESS FINANCING 
MARKET FAILURES 
Developing stock markets is not a realistic immediate solution 
As Figure 2 summarizes, there are several distinct theoretical responses to the 
financing problem. The dominant contemporary strategy in developing countries is to 
try to make financial markets more efficient by enforcing good governance. In theory 
it is true that if the rule of law can be enforced, corruption reduced, and greater 
transparency in government ensured, the result will be that contract-enforcement will 
also improve. Thus, good governance can in theory assist the development of risk 
sharing institutions like stock markets which require credible and cheap contract 
enforcement to be effective.  
 
The practical question is whether good governance reforms can be enforced quickly 
enough to have any effect on the pressing market failures facing developing countries. 
How much further would rule of law, anti-corruption, transparency and other good 
governance reforms have to proceed to make a significant impact on contract 
enforcement and disclosure sufficient to allow garment industry firms to raise money 
from efficient capital markets? When put in this way, all our respondents agreed that 
reliance on market-promoting good governance reforms would take far too long for 
them to raise the money they needed to ensure that Bangladesh’s emerging garment 
and textile industry has a secure future.  
 
This is not an argument against stock markets in general or the moves that are being 
taken to develop these markets in Bangladesh. The stock market in Bangladesh has 
been growing rapidly in terms of market capitalization. However, even in India where 
giant corporations do successfully raise money in the stock market, this is based 
largely on their established reputation as corporate giants rather than the transparency 
and regulatory strength of the Indian stock markets. The problem is that small and 
medium firms do not have the same reputational capital as some large firms may be 
able to develop. It will be a long time before small and medium sized Indian firms are 
able to raise funds for their expansion in Indian stock markets. That possibility is 
dependent on a much longer term process whereby contract enforcement and 
disclosure have improved to the extent that it becomes viable for investors to put their 
money into unknown startup firms. India is not close to that yet. The problem for 
Bangladesh is that many of its most entrepreneurial firms at the forefront of 
generating growth are medium-sized firms that would not benefit from marginal 
improvements in the stock market.  
 
A pragmatic approach in this context would be to work with existing financial 
institutions, the government and the private sector to see if existing financial 
instruments and strategies (or institutions and strategies adapted from similar 
countries) can be implemented in a way that would allow technology upgrading to 
happen faster. This may require government, business associations and other bodies to 
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develop some very specific governance capabilities to enable the monitoring and 
enforcement of specific instruments or strategies.  
 
Developing financing solutions for technology upgrading is likely to be challenging 
and pose difficulties. But these difficulties are likely to be a lot less serious if we 
focus on a few instruments and strategies. Moreover, it is more likely that we will be 
able to achieve some very specific governance capabilities required to make specific 
financing arrangements work in contrast to the very broad goals of good governance 
reforms that are actually much more difficult to implement to any significant effect. A 
few examples of the types of possible policy responses we are referring to are 
discussed below. These are indicative suggestions. Any particular policy proposal can 
only be taken forward if industry associations, banks and government agree that these 
financing challenges are important for the industry and for the country and therefore 
that solutions have to be worked out.  
 
Developing risk sharing financial instruments: Building on the Equity and 
Entrepreneurship Fund Model 
Many of the challenges involved in financing technology upgrading are widely 
recognized. Indeed, the government of Bangladesh has implicitly recognized many of 
these problems by setting up financial instruments to address the problem of risk 
sharing. An example of the latter is the Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund (EEF) set 
up in 2001.  
 
Although not directed towards the garment and textile sector, the EEF was set up to 
address the types of market failures constraining the financing of investments in new 
technologies identified in Figure 2. The EEF was limited to a number of sectors 
identified as thrust sectors by the government (IT and agro-industries). However, 
apart from its limited remit, we found that that the instrument suffers from a number 
of simple design problems. If these issues could be addressed, this fund or a similar 
one could be developed to assist the financing of critical upgrading in the garment and 
textile sector in Bangladesh. 
 
The objectives of the EEF are exactly the right ones. The government clearly 
recognized the difficulties of using bank lending to finance investment in new 
technologies. In the EEF instrument, the government buys up to a 49% equity stake in 
companies engaging in investments in new areas, relieving the entrepreneur of 
immediate and onerous interest payments. The entrepreneur can buy back the equity 
in 3 years at face value (implying a 3 year interest-free loan), or after 8 years at either 
face value or a vaguely defined break-up value to be determined from the balance 
sheet by accountants. Otherwise, the government has the option of eventually 
converting the equity into a loan, implying a significant long-term interest free loan 
till that point.  
 
However, as an internal evaluation of the Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund by the 
Bangladesh Bank (2006) shows, there are a number of problems in the design of the 
financing instrument. The projects financed were poorly chosen, and there is no 
obvious reason why the IT and agro-industries should have been prioritized. As a vital 
sector in Bangladesh, with significant entrepreneurial expertise, there is a case for also 
allocating upgrading funds to the garments and textile sector, particularly to develop 
high value-adding backward and forward linkages.  
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A second problem with the existing Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund is that its 
proper operation depends on truthful revelation of profits and asset values by recipient 
firms. For this, the instrument requires that recipient firms should be monitored, but 
this monitoring is delegated to commercial banks providing conventional loans to the 
same firms. The Bangladesh Bank simply administers the fund for the Government of 
Bangladesh and has no independent monitoring arrangement for these investments. 
Commercial bank representatives sit in on the recipient firm’s board meetings and 
monitor the investments for the Bangladesh Bank. But we know from the Bangladesh 
Bank’s (2006) evaluation that the monitoring has not been intensively carried out. 
This was confirmed by one of the banks involved in our survey which was involved in 
monitoring Equity and Entrepreneurship Fund investments. A possible reason is that 
the banks charged with monitoring had not actually contributed to the equity holding 
and therefore had little authority to exercise effective monitoring as real equity 
owners could. Finally, the design of the instrument did not provide any credible exit 
strategies for the external financier (in this case the government).  
 
Given the attractive financial package, it is not surprising (as the Bangladesh Bank 
evaluation shows) that many beneficiaries did indeed set up what appear to be viable 
new enterprises. At the same time, given the insufficient incentives and compulsions 
on firms, it is also not surprising that progress in implementing and learning new 
technologies was often slow. The types of technologies that were being adopted were 
often fairly straightforward and many could in principle have been financed in the 
traditional way by bank loans and would probably still have been viable. 
Nevertheless, the EEF is a significant instrument because it recognizes the importance 
of market failures in financial markets. It is important to ask how we could improve 
this instrument by changing its design and improving the governance capabilities of 
the agencies managing it.  
 
In the first place, the current design of the fund precludes vital sectors like the 
garment and textile industry. Instead of a predetermined sectoral allocation, a better 
design of the instrument would be to enable financing in any sector that satisfies the 
criteria of investing in potentially high value-adding technologies that have not yet 
been widely adopted. The requirement of potentially high profitability would be 
implicit in the rate of return requirements discussed later.  
 
A properly designed financing instrument for technology upgrading should achieve a 
combination of i) a pooling of risk so that an individual firm owner would not face 
ruin if a project to upgrade technology took longer than planned, ii) the creation of 
sufficient compulsion on the owner/manager to put in high levels of effort into the 
project, ideally also iii) a satisfactory market return for outside investors, though this 
may be assisted with complementary government subsidies in some cases. Finally, iv) 
given the problems of disclosure and enforcement that we have repeatedly referred to, 
a viable risk-sharing financial instrument in a developing country should rely as much 
as possible on easy-to-observe proxy indicators to assess profit and asset value 
indirectly.  
 
 29
DIVIDEND / PROFIT SHARE BUYBACK VALUE OF 
EQUITY STAKE
RISK-SHARING PROFILE
True profit and risk sharing 
Dividends based on profit 
sharing: linked to incremental 
export earnings for ease of 
observation
Moderate rate of asset value 
growth agreed in advance 
(agreed growth of value 
should be lower than the 
market rate of interest)
True risk sharing model: 
Upside return for financier 
can be higher than market 
rate of interest, downside loss 
for the firm is lower than the 
market rate of interest
Equity and 
Entrepreneurship Fund 
Dividend in theory but not 
clearly defined: zero dividend 
likely
Growth in asset value 
expected but not clearly 
defined: buyback likely to be 
at face value of investment
Lowest risk for borrower, 
highest risk for equity 
provider. Equivalent to an 
interest free or low interest 
‘loan’. 
Traditional Bank Loan
No share of profits required
Implicit buyback value is 
equivalent to a growth in the 
value of the investment equal 
to the market rate of interest
Traditional banking model: 
Highest risk for the borrower 
and lowest risk for the lender. 
Lender’s return is 
predetermined
 
Figure 6 Risk sharing characteristics of alternative financing instruments  
 
Figure 6 shows that the EEF is actually located at one end of the spectrum of possible 
risk sharing profiles. Here most of the risk falls on the financier, in this case the 
government, who can in addition expect almost no return from the investment. The 
‘buyback’ value of the equity is the price at which the firm can pay off the equity 
investor to buy back their claim on the assets of the company. The poorly defined 
buyback value in this instrument based on the book value of assets means that in 
effect the firm will be able to buy back the equity simply by repaying the original 
investment. In terms of the conditions for a viable instrument, the EEF clearly 
achieves a significant lowering of risk for firms investing in technology. However, 
there are virtually no pressures on the firm to adopt the technology rapidly or 
successfully. It is certainly not replicable because private investors, and in particular 
banks will be unlikely to contribute to such an instrument. And its success depends 
precisely on difficult-to-observe profits and asset values. The difficulty of observing 
these accurately in effect converts the instrument into a long-term interest free loan. 
The problem is that as fiscal resources of the Bangladesh government are limited, 
there is limited scope for extending such a non-replicable instrument to other sectors. 
 
At the other extreme of the risk sharing profile is the traditional banking model, where 
the return to the financier is predetermined and the borrower absorbs almost the entire 
risk implicit in the investment. The lender does not expect a share of profits but the 
effective buyback value requires a repayment of the original investment plus interest 
compounded to the date of repayment. We have discussed the theoretical limitations 
of this instrument for financing risky investments. This instrument does put strong 
compulsions on the borrower to adopt the technology quickly and successfully but 
because small delays can put enormous strain on the borrower, the borrower is likely 
to reject the offer of a loan for technology upgrading purposes. However, the 
instrument does satisfy the two other conditions that we identified above. By 
definition it provides an adequate market return to banks, and its operation does not 
require monitoring of difficult-to-observe profits or asset values. Its main problem is 
that this instrument is unlikely to be used for significant technology upgrading. 
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A true profit and risk sharing instrument would be located somewhere in between 
these two models. Some simple adaptations suggest how we could construct a profit 
sharing instrument by addressing the problems of disclosure. One solution would be 
to use an easy-to-observe proxy for profits. Export earnings are an obvious answer as 
they are relatively easy to observe and banks in Bangladesh already have 
arrangements that deduct interest due from export earnings. The difference is that in a 
risk sharing instrument the deduction from export earnings would not be based on a 
predetermined interest claim but would instead be a predetermined share or 
percentage of the incremental exports that are achieved as a result of the additional 
loan taken by a firm. As the garment industry is largely export-oriented, such a rule 
would achieve effective profit sharing, but based on an easy to monitor income stream 
rather than the disclosure of profits by the firm.  
 
This would achieve the aim of risk sharing because if there were delays in the 
achievement of profitability in the new investment, the owner would not be building 
up unserviceable interest liabilities. Thus, linking the dividend return to incremental 
export earnings could overcome the problem of accurate profit disclosure. 
Admittedly, this formula would only work in a predominantly export-oriented firm, 
but most garment and textile industry firms in Bangladesh would satisfy this criterion. 
 
The second requirement is that the design of the instrument should impose 
compulsions on the borrower to achieve the technology acquisition as rapidly as 
possible. Therefore there has to be an effective increase in the buyback value to 
reflect the growth in value of underlying assets as a result of successful technology 
adoption and adaptation. If there is no assumed growth in the value of the investment, 
the firm has reduced incentives to adopt the technology quickly. On the other hand the 
assumption of an excessive rate of growth of asset value passes the risk excessively 
on to the borrower. A compromise would be to agree in advance a moderate rate of 
increase in the underlying asset value. This would create adequate pressure on the 
firm to buy back the equity quickly, without making the investment excessively risky.  
 
By negotiating an appropriate mix of the buyback value and the incremental export 
earnings share, the instrument may also satisfy the requirement that it should provide 
an adequate return to outside investors. The risk-return profile for the outside investor 
is different here: there is a potential upside that may be greater than with a 
conventional loan if the investment goes well and incremental export earnings are 
large. The downside risk is that the return may be less than a conventional bank loan. 
But there is a floor to the downside risk that is set by the buyback value of the equity, 
so the outside investor is assured of making a positive return.  
 
The protection for the outside investor would be further increased if some or all of 
these profit and risk sharing financing instruments were backed by collateral, in the 
same way as traditional bank loans. This would make it more likely that the source of 
funding would not be limited to the funds available from the government of 
Bangladesh through the Bangladesh Bank. However, for some technologies, the core 
funding may have to come from government, in a redesigned Equity and 
Entrepreneurship Fund, or in the form of a subsidy stream to commercial risk sharing 
instruments.  
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The numerical details of the buyback and profit share will have to be negotiated by 
the equity investor and the investing firm, on a case by case basis. It is likely in some 
cases that the instrument may require an additional but relatively small government 
subsidy to make the return acceptable to the outside investor. In some cases it may be 
an entirely public fund that will have to be invested. However, a risk sharing 
investment that offers considerable upside returns to equity investors is more likely to 
be replicable, perhaps requiring some limited government subsidies that are likely to 
be significantly less than if the entire equity was based on budgetary resources.   
 
Finally, the proposed instrument would satisfy the final condition that its 
implementation should not be based on difficult-to-observe data. Incremental export 
earnings are easy to observe and buyback asset values can be agreed in advance. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of disclosure and enforcement would still prevent the 
private individual investor from participating in such an instrument either directly or 
through private contracting in capital markets. This is why banks with their superior 
enforcement and monitoring capabilities have to continue to play an important role in 
monitoring and managing investment financing to small and medium sized companies 
in developing countries. They are likely to be the main investors if any future risk 
sharing financial instrument can be devised, either independently or with appropriate 
government assistance.  
 
Clearly these improvements in the design of the EEF would require an appropriate 
regulatory structure on the part of government in case of disputes and to ensure that 
exit by financiers was assured in occasional cases where investments failed to produce 
results. Financial judgement would also be required to determine the effective rates of 
return that determined the buy back values for the ‘equity’ in different categories of 
technology investments. Thus, it would be important to develop clearly defined 
governance capabilities on the part of the regulatory agencies, banks and business 
associations to make such a scheme work. The potential social benefits of developing 
new financial instruments appropriate for the institutional context of Bangladesh and 
which can address pressing needs of technology upgrading are likely to make this a 
worthwhile investment in governance. 
 
Islamic banking instruments can be modified to achieve effective risk and profit 
sharing 
The equity-type profit and risk-sharing instruments discussed in the last section have 
strong and obvious parallels with the profit and risk-sharing principles of Islamic 
banking. The profit and risk-sharing model suggested in the middle row of Figure 6 
would clearly be a good candidate for Islamic banking institutions to try and develop 
further. It is very likely that the underlying principles of such an instrument are 
compatible with Islamic banking principles, or they are likely to become so with 
minor modifications. No interest is involved in these instruments. Moreover, the 
instruments offer the opportunity of genuine risk and profit sharing that Islamic 
banking principles encourage.  
 
One of the banks in our survey is involved in Islamic banking and was also one of the 
pioneering banks in the garments industry. It was clear from our discussions that 
Islamic financial institutions are very keen to develop genuine risk and profit sharing 
instruments. However, effective profit and risk sharing instruments of the type 
discussed in the last section have not yet emerged in the long-term industrial lending 
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of banks committed to Islamic banking. The reason may be closely related to the 
inadequate provisions for disclosure of profits that we have discussed earlier. If an 
Islamic bank were actually to lend according to Islamic principles of profit and risk 
sharing, it may be deprived of a reasonable return as a result of the borrower 
systematically under-stating profits. To protect themselves from this obvious risk, 
Islamic banks in Bangladesh and in other developing countries have evolved non-
interest forms of financing that nevertheless have the effect of requiring the borrower 
to make fixed repayments on loans backed by collateral to protect the bank from 
default. From the borrower’s perspective, this loads the risks of adoption and 
adaptation largely on the borrower, in much the same way as in conventional banking 
arrangements.  
 
In principle, the Islamic profit and risk sharing approach can provide a variety of 
financial instruments tailored to address the problems of risk sharing to accelerate 
technology upgrading without exposing the bank to excessive risk. The development 
of these instruments should therefore be an exciting challenge for Islamic banking in 
developing countries. Indeed, the refinements suggested for the Equity and 
Entrepreneurship Fund could potentially make it a financing instrument appropriate 
for Islamic banks (perhaps with further minor refinements). For instance, as profits 
are difficult to measure, it may be appropriate to deduce a profit share from export 
earnings. This vastly simplifies the profit sharing formula and the associated 
disclosure requirements.  
 
The equity repayment could also be based on a formula similar to the one discussed 
above where the bank and the borrower can predetermine through negotiation the 
buyback value of the equity at future dates based on the risk appetites of financier and 
firm. Such a formula may be entirely consistent with Islamic banking principles with 
some fine tuning. At the same time, as already suggested, these financing instruments 
would allow the firm to significantly reduce the risk of building up unsustainable debt 
and possibly losing owner collateral due to unplanned delays in technology adoption. 
This in turn may significantly assist technology upgrading investments. As discussed 
in the previous section, the success of these instruments depends on developing 
appropriate governance capabilities in the banks offering these instruments as well as 
in the regulatory agencies of the state.  
 
Direct government subsidies to reduce risk in technology upgrading 
An alternative approach to sharing the risk involved in technology upgrading is to 
provide a direct subsidy on the capital cost of acquiring pre-specified technologies. 
This was the preferred choice amongst our surveyed firms for obvious reasons. The 
appeal of this approach also comes from the strategy of Bangladesh’s neighbour 
India, which also happens to be a major competitor with Bangladesh in the textile and 
garment sector. Upgrading in the textile sector in India has been given a big boost 
with a multi-billion dollar injection of funds under the textile sector Technology 
Upgradation Fund Scheme, TUFS, adopted by the Indian government in 1999 
(Ananthakrishnan and Jain-Chandra 2005: 23).  
 
Under the scheme, investments in pre-specified machinery were given a five per cent 
subsidy on the interest charged on purchase loans. Writing in 2005, Ananthakrishnan 
and Jain-Chandra (2005) calculate that more than a billion dollars had already been 
disbursed under the Indian scheme. Clearly, with such large amounts of subsidy being 
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disbursed, there would be a significant impact on the purchase of new machinery and 
on up-scaling production to achieve significant scale economies. Effectively such a 
subsidy reduces the risks faced by the individual entrepreneur in buying a technology 
that may take more time to turn profitable than was initially planned.  
 
It is too early to evaluate the results of the Indian scheme. There do not seem to have 
been any specialized governance structures set up to ensure that leakages of subsidy 
into machinery purchases in unplanned sectors did not happen. There is some 
indication that the main beneficiaries of the subsidy have been a small number of very 
large firms (Ananthakrishnan and Jain-Chandra 2005: 23). It is likely that in the 
absence of significant monitoring capabilities there will have been some amount of 
waste in the implementation of the subsidy. But there is no doubt that a significant 
amount of additional investment in new machinery has taken place in India.  
 
Given the scarcity of budgetary resources, it is unlikely that Bangladesh could 
immediately match the Indian rates of subsidy, and in the short run a more targeted 
interest rate subsidy may be more feasible. This too would need to be matched with 
governance capabilities in the government agencies monitoring the use of disbursed 
funds. The monitoring would have to make sure that the subsidy was only claimed for 
investments that were authorized for clearly defined technologies and that over time 
these investments were paying off in terms of value addition in the sector. India with 
its greater budgetary resources could tolerate a higher level of wastage than 
Bangladesh. This implies that Bangladesh will have to aspire to higher monitoring 
standards precisely because resources are limited.  
 
These observations point to the types of areas where governance capacity building 
should be concentrated. LDCs like Bangladesh cannot ignore the challenges they face 
from next tier developing countries like India and China. The latter have many 
explicit and implicit subsidy strategies for developing manufacturing and high value 
adding services. It is therefore imperative that Bangladesh begins the task of 
improving its capacities to deliver and manage narrowly defined subsidies to deal 
with critical market failures, in this case in technology upgrading. 
 
A starting point may be to set up a limited fund for providing specific technology 
upgrading subsidies managed by a dedicated agency within government with high 
quality personnel charged with monitoring the narrowly defined subsidy scheme. In 
Bangladesh, it would make sense to start with a much less ambitious scheme than 
India, test if minimal governance capabilities could be developed in the agency 
charged with its monitoring, and scale up if the results were promising.  
 
Government/Donor subsidies to reduce setup costs in technology acquisition: 
The Danish B2B Model 
A significant component of the risk involved in technology upgrading is the up-front 
investment that the entrepreneur has to make in establishing contacts with potential 
suppliers of technology, exploring alternative financing arrangements and establishing 
relationships with suppliers, financiers and others. If the project does not take off, 
these up-front investments are an irrecoverable loss for firm. This is a significant risk 
that can prevent entrepreneurs from examining all options and directions of expansion 
and technology expansion. In the successful newly industrializing countries of East 
Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, governments played a critical role in absorbing some of 
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these setup costs of coordinating suppliers, investors and financiers through 
coordination.  
 
In many contemporary developing countries, government capabilities in this area are 
weak. This suggests a possible role for external catalysts to overcome these market 
failures because the payoffs to coordination activities are often very evident. An 
interesting case where donor development partners have been playing an important 
role in Bangladesh is provided by the B2B (Business to Business) support facility of 
Danida, the Danish aid agency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark 2006). This 
programme identifies viable and reputable Danish companies and introduces them to 
developing countries and potential local partners with whom joint ventures or 
partnerships could potentially be set up.  
 
The Danish programme vets high quality Danish technology providers, finances their 
visit to the developing country and sets up meetings with domestic entrepreneurs. Its 
main purpose is to cover the costs of potential Danish companies to come to a 
developing country that they do not know and where they might otherwise not have 
come. In other words, the programme covers only the coordination costs and does not 
currently contribute to the investment cost or the subsequent risks faced by domestic 
investors.  
 
But consistent with our argument of risk, this limited support has resulted in many 
new investments with relatively sophisticated technologies being brought into poor 
developing countries. One of our surveyed firms was at an advanced stage of 
implementing a project with Danish involvement in this way. It is quite possible that 
many of these potentially profitable investments may otherwise not have taken place.  
 
The Danish programme is obviously restricted to Danish companies, and this 
significantly limits the range of technologies and sources of financing that the 
Bangladeshi firm can examine and assess through this programme. Nevertheless, this 
is a good example of how relatively small investments in coordination and 
information provision can help bring about investment in new technologies in 
developing countries. It is a model that other donors should seriously consider, and 
indeed there is no reason why the government of Bangladesh should not consider 
coordinating development partners to provide this service in a coordinated way. 
 
A successful scaling up of the Danish B2B experience would need to take into 
account possible factors that account for the relative success of the programme. It 
does not seem to waste a lot of resources in pointless foreign visits and coordination 
activities that do not go anywhere. Waste is apparently minimized because the remit 
of the programme is very narrowly defined: it is restricted to Danish companies, and 
the programme is answerable to Danish taxpayers who would presumably be worried 
if very few deals were completed with Danish companies.  
 
In scaling up the programme, it would be important to ensure that a broader agency 
had clear targets so as to ensure that resources that were spent in facilitating 
coordination met targets. If the agency failed to meet minimal targets, the programme 
could be reconsidered after a predetermined period.  
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LABOUR SKILLS AND TRAINING 
 
KEY SURVEY FINDINGS ON SKILLS SHORTAGES
i) Significant shortages of both skilled and ‘unskilled’ workers
ii) The helper system of ‘on-the-job’ training under threat from rising labour costs
iii) Many training institutions in the private sector and several organized by industry 
associations for mid and high level skills but most suffer from low uptake
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
i) Helper system for training unskilled workers needs to be complemented by alternatives 
(such as government funded induction schemes for new workers)
ii) Low market demand for training provided by fee-based institutions (market failures) could 
be countered with subsidies for training (if subsidy is well-designed, for instance across-the-
board tax exemptions or other implicit subsidies  in accredited training institutes 
or subsidized loans to  taking accredited courses)
per student
employees  
Figure 7 Survey Findings and Policy Proposals for Skills and Training 
Significant shortages of both skilled and ‘unskilled’ workers 
Despite being a labour surplus economy, the garment sector in Bangladesh suffers 
from perennial labour shortages. Some of the shortages are due to shortages of 
specific skills, but paradoxically there is also a shortage of ‘unskilled’ labour. The 
reason is that while labour is abundant, workers exposed to factory discipline and 
conditions of work in a high pressure export sector are difficult to find. The skills 
provided by formal school education are socially important but do not necessarily fill 
this gap.  
 
The process of creating an industrial workforce from a pre-industrial or household 
economy (in the case of female workers) is a costly one and subject to market failures. 
The firms carrying out the training are not likely to capture the full benefits of their 
investment because labour is mobile. In a very similar way, training at mid and higher 
levels of the skills spectrum is also subject to market failure, for the same reasons. In 
both cases, underinvestment in training is likely to take place.  
 
Our survey confirmed this expectation. However, the skills shortage was differently 
perceived by firms of different types. Small and even medium sized firms in sectors 
where Bangladesh had a significant export position (and therefore a pre-existing large 
pool of labour) were the least likely to report a significant skills shortage. These firms 
relied on the labour turnover across firms to replenish losses in their skilled workforce 
and to deal with cyclical fluctuations in their order books. Larger firms and those in 
more specialized niches of the market reported more significant skills shortages. For 
firms attempting technology upgrading in new areas, the training period is difficult to 
predict as discussed earlier. This makes investment in training also suffer from the 
problems of financing for the reasons that we have already discussed.  
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The helper system of ‘on-the-job’ training under threat from rising labour costs 
One solution to the market failure in training unskilled labour was informally 
institutionalized in Bangladesh in the ‘helper’ apprentice system. Here, the solution to 
the potential market failure was to pass on a significant part of the training cost to 
trainees. Apprentices were taken on at lower wages as helpers, where their main task 
was to learn the jobs of production line workers who they would eventually join. If 
apprentices left for other firms, the firm providing the training did not take a big hit 
because the cost of the training was to a large extent covered by the worker herself 
during the training period.  
 
Despite the obvious criticisms one could make of this system in terms of fairness, in 
the absence of alternative institutions to address the market failure, our respondents 
argued that this was a very effective system for achieving rapid growth in the 
manufacturing workforce. In particular it worked effectively in inducting a previously 
untapped source of labour, namely female household workers who had no previous 
experience in factory production. The rapid growth of the female manufacturing 
workforce in Bangladesh is consistent with this argument. 
 
This particular institutional solution to the market failure in training is currently under 
threat (according to almost all our firm respondents) as a result of a growing pressure 
from workers and the government to raise the minimum wage level. Their concern 
was that this would affect in particular the viability of the helper system as an implicit 
apprenticeship system with potential workers partially subsidizing their own training. 
 
If this becomes difficult, the absorption of large numbers of trainee workers into the 
sector may be affected, not because firms do not have the resources to provide the 
training, but because of a prisoner’s dilemma problem where each firm will be 
attempting to entice already trained workers from other firms. And firms engaging in 
training workers will be thinking twice about the incentives of other firms to poach 
their workers. This is the heart of the market failure affecting training in developing 
countries.  
 
Many training institutions but most suffer from low uptake 
One of the paradoxes about the skills shortage is that there seems to be not just an 
unmet demand for skills but also a growing supply of private training institutes and 
yet the uptake of training at these institutes is relatively low. Some of the training 
infrastructure has been set up by private sector training institutes targeting specific 
skills gaps in the garment sector. But the private training sector faces serious 
problems because of low uptake and the unwillingness of the garment employers to 
pay very much for training their workforce. Here is a clear example of a market 
failure.  
 
Training is available and required, but is not taken up to its full extent despite 
employers facing serious shortages of skills. The problem once again is that the 
employer financing the training faces a market failure (externality) problem because 
the worker or manager being trained could leave the firm after the training and 
bargain for a higher wage elsewhere. Nor does the strategy of underpaying staff work 
at this level because the underpayment would have to be significant to cover the cost 
of training at these levels of skill. Such underpayment would not be acceptable to 
many of the staff concerned and this would rule out such a strategy. So the firm would 
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have to bear a much larger share of the total cost of training at this level. The low 
uptake reflects the firms’ unwillingness to accept this exposure. 
 
Thus, there are two separate problems here. The first is the identification of skills 
shortages and ensuring the supply of potential training. Our survey confirmed that 
significant progress is being made in this direction. Apart from a rapidly growing 
number of private training institutes, a number of industry associations including 
BGMEA were running their own institutes such as the Bangladesh Institute of 
Fashion Technology. UNIDO was also engaged in a major needs assessment exercise 
attempting to identify skills shortages in the garment and related sectors in 
Bangladesh (PPMA 2006). This information will further assist in developing 
appropriate fee-paying training programmes in Bangladesh. 
 
However, we are more concerned with the second problem, namely that market 
failures were attenuating the incentives of entrepreneurs to purchase the training that 
was available for their workforce. One of our survey respondents was a training 
institute, who confirmed that their institute faced significant challenges in persuading 
firms to purchase their training despite pressing skills shortages in the sector.  
 
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES TO ADDRESS MARKET 
FAILURES IN TRAINING AND SKILL ACQUISITION 
There are a number of solutions that could address the market failures affecting labour 
skills and training. However, each solution needs to be carefully designed and 
requires specific governance capabilities on the part of the government and/or other 
stakeholders to ensure that the solution addressing the market failure will actually 
work.  
 
Supplant ‘helper’ system with alternative training schemes for ‘unskilled’ 
workers 
The helper system is being strained in a number of ways. The employers’ argument 
that demands for wage increases are undermining this system may be true, but it is 
also true that in some cases the system may be open to abuse from the perspective of 
workers. In any case, it is clear that this type of apprenticeship is not producing 
enough new recruits to the manufacturing workforce as there is a persistent shortage 
even of ‘unskilled’ workers. It is often not appreciated that ‘unskilled’ is a relative 
term. New entrants into the manufacturing workforce require a host of specific skills 
to be able to operate in a modern factory environment and the acquisition of these 
skills costs time and resources.  
 
An interesting suggestion coming from some respondents was the possibility of a role 
for government in financing or partially subsidizing induction courses for new recruits 
into the manufacturing workforce. In a society where the vast majority of the 
population have still not been exposed to manufacturing production, this is a 
potentially important suggestion, and not just for the garment industry.  
 
A short but intensive induction programme over several months which exposed 
aspiring entrants to basic skills, health and safety conditions, exposure to factory 
discipline and so on could help to turn out potential workers who could be absorbed 
into production at much lower cost for the employing firm. The programme would 
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have to offer accreditation for successful candidates. For such a programme to be 
successful the accreditation would have to be useful for potential employers, enabling 
them to directly employ workers who did not need a long period of induction.  
 
Quality assurance requirements imply that it would be better if the training is not 
directly provided by government bodies but by private institutes receiving 
government funding. This would mean that if the accreditation offered by a particular 
institute was inadequate, for instance if its accredited trainees were rejected by 
employers, its training contract and the subsidies it received could be terminated. 
Such training programmes could also be set up in mofussil towns and even further 
afield to offer training and potential employment opportunities in regions that are 
typically excluded from these opportunities.  
 
As Bangladesh strives to find new manufacturing niches in the global market, the 
supply of workers who can rapidly adapt to factory working will become increasingly 
critical in maintaining competitive advantage over other developing countries. But the 
chances of an induction strategy being successful will require careful identification of 
general factory induction training needs by industry associations, policy advocacy by 
associations for this to be recognized as a government priority and a receptive 
government that understands the significant long-term benefits of providing some 
financing for providing the basic training appropriate for converting agricultural and 
informal sector workers into potential manufacturing workers. 
 
Encourage uptake of training in accredited private training institutes with 
targeted training subsidies 
Market failures are clearly slowing down the absorption of training already available 
in private training institutes. The obvious textbook answer to this problem would be to 
make available a subsidy to the training provider, the employer or the employee so 
that the cost of the training comes down and there is an incentive for the employer, 
the employee or both to pay for the training.  
 
However, there is a very real danger with all subsidy schemes that resources will be 
wasted or that the subsidy will distort the allocation of training towards programmes 
that have a subsidy attached regardless of the worth of the training in terms of its 
contribution to employee productivity. The design of the subsidy scheme is therefore 
very important to minimize these dangers.  
 
A subsidy to employers for employees they train may not be efficient because some 
employers may claim subsidies for employees who have not received any significant 
training. The alternative of providing the subsidy to the training institute makes more 
sense but this also has problems. A subsidy to the training institute would have to be 
across the board so as not to discriminate against any types of training. It could be 
delivered through some forms of tax exemption or other implicit subsidies.  
 
If the subsidy to the training institute was linked to numbers of student completing 
their courses, this would reveal how attractive that training was in the market and the 
potential waste of subsidy would be minimized. In order not to discriminate against 
expensive training schemes that provided high value-adding training, the subsidy may 
have to be a proportion of the training cost rather than a flat subsidy per student.  
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However, there are significant limitations in this strategy. The main problem is that 
this subsidy may not make a significant difference to the price of training and 
therefore may have a minimal effect on the up-take of skills training. The training 
institute receiving the subsidy may have little incentive to reduce prices enough 
and/or the subsidy may not allow a significant reduction in price. In that case, the 
take-up of training may not increase sufficiently.  
 
This is most likely for more expensive training or when the gap between the market 
price of training and the price employers are willing to pay (given the market failure) 
is large. In this case, a more sophisticated subsidy arrangement would have to be 
devised. For instance, one option may be for government to give interest free or low 
interest loans to employees who wish to improve their skills. This could be a matching 
subsidy such that the employer also paid a part of the cost of the training, and the 
employee paid a part financed by an interest-free or low interest loan from the 
government. The employee would then repay the loan once he or she was back in 
employment and presumably enjoying an improvement in income.  
 
The advantage of such a system is that a more effective subsidy can be awarded, and 
the government is more confident that the training selected jointly by the employer 
and the employee would indeed be value-enhancing since both would be paying a part 
of the total cost. But if employees have a high probability of changing jobs, employers 
may not be willing to pay any significant part of the training cost, and in these cases 
the training is most efficiently financed by employee loans.  
 
Over time, the cost of the subsidy may not be very large as a significant part of these 
loans would eventually start to be repaid. However to ensure repayments, governance 
capabilities in administering such a scheme would have to be credibly developed. It is 
important to only initiate such a scheme if these governance capabilities can be 
developed. Effective collection of the loans is not just important for fiscal reasons. 
The effectiveness and credibility of the loan recovery is essential to ensure that both 
employers and employees have strong incentives to ensure that they are purchasing 
high quality training. If employees know they have to pay back a loan, they will 
ensure that they and their employers will strive to only purchase training that will be 
likely to allow the employee to earn more in the future. 
 
Finally, the employer’s contribution to training, and indeed their ability and 
willingness to engage in effective on-the-job training is closely connected to the 
problem of financing learning. Expenditure on training is not just subject to the 
market failures discussed here but also the general problem of uncertainty about the 
period after which the employer can start making money, in the way discussed in the 
section on risk sharing. If the employer is unable to share the risk of financing the 
learning process, it is not very likely that they will countenance any significant 
expenditure on training. Thus, employers are more likely to make a financial 
contribution to training their workers and employees if their financing of this 
expenditure can be organized through risk sharing institutions.  
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LAND ALLOCATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SCALE 
ECONOMIES 
The problems of acquiring land can be a serious constraint for new projects and for 
expanding existing operations in developing countries, particularly in relatively 
densely populated ones. Our survey found that this was lower down on the list of 
problems for existing firms, though as we report below, most were operating multiple 
plants as a direct result of land market problems.  
 
KEY SURVEY FINDINGS ON LAND MARKET FAILURES
i) Land scarcity prevents contiguous expansion: instead expansion results in the acquisition 
of multiple plants in different locations
ii) Scale economies and clustering economies lost 
iii) Developments in unauthorized areas particularly (but not exclusively) for small firms
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
i) Viable industrial zones with good infrastructure will take years of preparation and land 
acquisition to set up but effective agencies to pursue this should be set up in earnest
ii) Enforcement of zoning laws should take into account the availability or otherwise of 
alternatives for relocation 
iii) In the meantime, infrastructure provision to existing clusters and assistance in land 
acquisition around existing clusters should receive attention
 
Figure 8 Survey Findings and Policy Proposals for Land Market Failures  
 
Land scarcity prevents contiguous expansion 
The expectation of market failures in land markets was strongly supported in our 
survey. As the list of firms in the Appendix shows, the typical pattern is for the same 
entrepreneur or holding group to have a relatively large number of small to medium 
sized plants in different locations. The survey confirmed that the predominant reason 
for this was the difficulty of acquiring contiguous pieces of land at low transaction 
cost.  
 
Scale economies and clustering economies lost 
A significant implication of this is that many scale economies and clustering 
economies cannot be captured by the very entrepreneurs who have the experience, the 
entrepreneurial skills and track record to benefit most from these economies. Many of 
our surveyed entrepreneurs reported significant time wasted simply travelling from 
plant to plant. Multiple plants also affected the quality of supervision the owner could 
exercise over all the plants. Scale economies were lost because some expensive fixed 
installations have to be wastefully replicated including management and supervisory 
personnel. 
 
The loss of scale economies is a serious problem not only because scale allows the 
production of more competitively priced products but also because the tendency is for 
buyers to prefer sellers who can accept orders on a very significant scale. In the 
coming years, Bangladesh will be increasingly forced to compete with countries like 
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China and India that are aggressively acquiring scale economies in their textile and 
garment sectors precisely for this reason. In the long run therefore, Bangladesh also 
has to have a strategy to consolidate its textile and garment sector and achieve as 
many scale economies as possible. The consolidation of plants belonging to the same 
owner is the obvious starting point.   
 
No less significant is the loss of potential clustering economies because similar firms 
cannot set up in proximate locations. This deprives them of clustering economies that 
can be important particularly when firms start to move up the value chain. 
International evidence suggests that if firms are upgrading using similar technologies, 
they can gain significantly by being located close to each other. This allows them to 
share technological knowhow and skilled workers and to coordinate technology 
acquisition in ways that promise significant collective benefits. The absence of 
significant clustering in Bangladesh may have significant effects in the future if 
technology upgrading begins in earnest. 
 
Development in unauthorized zones is common 
The absence of clear zoning laws, the difficulty of acquiring land and the shortage of 
infrastructure in areas far from urban centres has resulted in a significant amount of 
industrial expansion in unauthorized areas. This includes the setting up of industrial 
production within urban areas that are in grey areas or directly contravening zoning 
laws. Clearly, these developments are disliked by urban residents as well as 
entrepreneurs who have followed zoning laws. Governments have begun to clamp 
down on violations of zoning, environmental and other laws. However, entrepreneurs 
in the unenviable situation of having sunk capital in an unauthorized zone are clearly 
vulnerable to potentially high costs of relocation. They are understandably just as 
angry with the authorities for not providing attractive legal locations for development 
in the first place. 
 
These problems are particularly acute for relatively small firms. They are less likely to 
be able to find contiguous land plots near reasonably good infrastructure and then to 
negotiate the politically difficult process of transacting multiple plots of land to build 
up a plot where they can set up operations. Some of our respondents who were early 
entrants in the business looked back with nostalgia to the days (two decades ago) 
when reasonably priced contiguous plots could be purchased in places like Mirpur or 
Tongi. This is now impossible for new entrants.  
 
The implication is clearly that unless dramatic action is taken to make land near 
reasonable infrastructure available for the next generation of entrepreneurs, 
Bangladesh’s progress into manufacturing may face serious constraints in the near 
future. We believe we would have got an even more urgent message if we could have 
surveyed potential entrants as opposed to those who had somehow already entered.  
 
POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES TO ADDRESS LAND MARKET 
FAILURES 
The achievement of better scale economies in the garment industry is a necessary part 
of technology upgrading and therefore an immediate target for policy attention in 
Bangladesh. If so, land for expansion will soon become a critical condition for the 
success of any technology upgrading strategy. Land constraints are also important to 
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address simply for the normal expansion of the industry, to enable new small firms to 
enter without having to violate land use regulations. Good governance reforms are 
likely to have the slowest of impacts on developing country land markets that face 
seriously high transaction costs. Enforcing property rights effectively and sorting out 
multiple and conflicting land claims and contradictory documentation is bound to be a 
hugely expensive social process that typically takes many decades to make significant 
progress. In the meantime, practical solutions have to be found to address immediate 
problems and issues.  
 
To rely on good governance reforms to make land markets efficient and thereby solve 
these problems by allowing entrepreneurs to buy land in well-working land markets is 
an appealing but unrealistic strategy. In the short to medium term alternative 
responses have to be considered and solutions found if manufacturing growth is to 
continue. This is also the comparative international evidence from all the international 
development experience that we have access to (Khan 2004). 
 
Administrative and political preparations for effective land acquisition take time 
and work has to start urgently 
The most obvious solution in the absence of well working land markets is the 
provision of industrial zones and parks by government for designated industrial 
sectors. However, this also requires significant governance capabilities on the part of 
government because acquiring and developing large tracts of contiguous land is by no 
means simple, partly because of the difficulty of dealing with conflicting land rights, 
absent and conflicting documentation, and therefore the absence of deep land markets 
where land values are well known. The process of acquisition and compensation is 
therefore fraught with political risk and very often charges of unfairness because it is 
difficult to work out who should be compensated and how much.  
 
The experience of Nandigram and Singur in West Bengal tell us that considerable 
administrative capacity and political finesse is required to address the land crisis 
facing industry. To address the looming land crisis, steps clearly have to be taken 
from now in Bangladesh and it will take several years before these capacities can be 
sufficiently developed for significant industrial zones and parks to be developed. The 
BGMEA’s proposal for setting up garment villages does not just have budgetary 
implications for land acquisition. The political and administrative requirements for 
actually carrying out the land acquisition near potential infrastructural installations 
will require much more than a budgetary approval.  
 
Appropriate governance capabilities have to be developed in administrative agencies 
that are charged with resolving land acquisition problems to set up the industrial 
zones. Even more important, the importance of this for Bangladesh’s continuing 
development will have to be politically established. The Indian example shows that 
the administrative and political problems in land acquisition are much more serious 
than the budgetary ones. 
 
At this stage Bangladesh probably does not have either the strong administrative 
capacities to deal with the myriad problems involved in creating large industrial 
zones, nor the political constituency which would support such a programme. Clearly, 
industry associations not just in the garment and textile industry, but across the 
Bangladeshi manufacturing sectors have their work cut out to make this case and 
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strive to create the administrative and governance capabilities to implement these 
requirements over the next few years.  
 
Enforcement of zoning laws should be phased in gradually 
If the creation of alternative industrial zones is likely to take considerable time, this 
has immediate and important implications for the enforcement of complementary laws 
regarding industrial zoning. There is strong political pressure on governments by 
other constituencies (residents, environmental campaigners and others) to rapidly 
enforce zoning laws on industry that has often located in prohibited areas. However, 
there is a need here to do a social cost-benefit analysis. If industry is forced to cease 
production in certain sites without any alternative sites being available, the social cost 
is likely in many cases to be significantly higher than the social benefit. The 
enforcement of these laws should therefore proceed at the same pace as alternative 
sites that are feasible in terms of price and infrastructural amenities become available.  
 
Interim Steps: infrastructure provision to existing clusters and assistance with 
land acquisition 
As the development of industrial zones, garment villages and so on will take time, and 
probably more time than many advocates of these strategies believe, interim measures 
are required to address immediate problems in the industry. A number of interim 
measures could be considered.  
 
For instance, there are already several clusters of firms in and around the major cities, 
particularly Dhaka. The government could consider releasing public land near these 
clusters to allow expansion of industrial clusters. These decisions may also be 
controversial, and may require for instance some lands designated as ‘forest’ lands 
being reclassified as appropriate for industrial development. Many forest areas near 
Savar and Gazipur have long since stopped being forests due to unauthorized factory 
construction and a policy decision has to be taken as to whether this industrial 
development can be feasibly rolled back in these areas.  
 
Reclaiming these areas as forests may have a social cost that is infeasible in terms of 
lost capital, production possibilities and employment losses. If rolling back these 
developments is not feasible, the economic and political reality has to be confronted. 
It may be preferable to regularize at least some of these industrial developments and 
regulate them in a transparent way rather than allowing the current practice of 
informal payoffs to enforcement officials to continue. Forest land further afield could 
then be effectively protected by allowing clustering around these existing clusters.  
 
Another advantage of regularizing some carefully selected industrial clusters, for 
instance in the areas north of Dhaka would be that land for expansion can also be 
made available as the state owns significant areas of khas and forest land in some of 
these areas. While genuine forests are a considerable national resource, small plots of 
‘forest’ lands without any trees which are in the middle of significant industrial 
developments that are not at all feasible for dismantling can be made available for the 
expansion of existing industrial clusters. Many of these forest lands are small plots 
completely cut off by industrial and commercial developments all around them. These 
suggestions do not represent an ideal solution but in a land-scarce economy these 
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options should be carefully considered and compared with the options of not doing 
anything or trying to dismantle very significant industrial developments.  
 
If this is a direction in which regularization should proceed, governance capabilities 
need to be developed to take this forward. First there would need to be a survey of 
existing clusters, both approved and informal, the distribution of forest, khas and 
private lands to determine areas where it would be socially advantageous to regularize 
developments, and identify other areas where relocation would be a better option in 
terms of a social cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Secondly, available public land in these areas could be used to develop small to 
medium scale industrial zones which could be leased out to developers. In this way 
relatively cheap land could be made available to startup companies and new entrants 
while also generating an income stream for government through lease rentals. Some 
land could also be made available to existing firms in the region which are looking for 
expansion and achieving scale economies to compete with Bangladesh’s increasingly 
aggressive competitors. Clusters could also be encouraged through the provision of 
infrastructure to existing clusters and the construction of appropriate transport 
networks. 
 
These interim measures would hardly be sufficient to address the long-term 
challenges of making significant amounts of land available for industrial 
development. As we have argued, that requires a much more significant 
administrative and political preparation, and the areas in which those developments 
may eventually happen would probably be far away from Dhaka where significant 
land blocks may eventually be available for acquisition. A further precondition for the 
development of these future industrial zones away from the capital would be the 
budgetary capability of the state to provide high quality infrastructure in those areas. 
This is why a series of interim measures is vital to allow industrial development to 
continue in a legal and regulated way in the next few years.  
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APPENDIX: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN SURVEY AND IN 
STAKEHOLDERS CONFERENCE 
 
 
FACTORIES 
 
1) Elite Garments Industries Ltd. 
Owner: Mr. Ramzul Seraj (Managing Director) 
Location: Gazipur 
Type of factory: Shirt / knit 
Number of workers: around 1500. Mainly large scale production of shirts. 
 
2) Fibertex Shirt MFG Ltd. 
3) Interfab Shirt Mfg. Ltd 
Owner: Md. Shimul Hasan (Managing Director) 
Location: Gazipur 
Type of factory: Small-scale production of shirt (subcontracting) 
Number of workers: 230 
Number & Type of machines: 110 sewing machines. 
 
4) KS. Embroidery & Punching Ltd. 
5) Feiya ( BD ) Trading 
Owner: Mohammed Sohel (Managing Director) 
Location: Uttara 
Type of factory: embroidery 
Number of workers: 50 
Investment (initial): US $ 15000 
Number & type of machines: Seven. Small-scale operation based on a partnership with a Chinese 
investor. 
 
6) Greenland Garments Ltd. 
Owner: Zulfiquar Rahman (Managing Director) 
Location: Gazipur 
Type of Factory: Dyeing & Knit & garment (shirt): Composite Knit Factory 
Number of workers: 140 – Dyeing/ 65 – Knitting/ 700 – Garments 
Number & type of machine: 14 – Dyeing/ 13 – Knitting/ 267 – Garments/ Auxiliary machines – 9 / 
testing laboratory – 9. Medium scale integrated production. 
 
7) Mark Designers Group 
8) Mark – 2000 Limited 
9) Jeans Processing Ltd. 
Owner: Ejaz Ahmed 
Location: Mirpur 
Type of factory: Denim & Twills bottom 
Number of workers: 153 
Initial Investment: US$ 100,000 
Number & type of machines: 60 / 4 types 
 
10) The Immaculate Accessories. Ltd. 
11) The Immaculate Apparels Ltd. 
Owner: Kazi Iftekhar Ahmed (Managing Director) 
Location: Mirpur 
Type of factory: woven & printed labels / accessories 
Number of workers: 15 (initial) 
Initial Investment: machines US $ 70,000. 
Number & type of machine: 4 woven and printed label machines. 
 
12) Mohammadi Group 
Owner: Anisul Huq (Managing Director) 
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Location: Uttara 
Type of factory: Large-scale cutting and stitching mainly of shirts. Group owns 7+ companies with 
around 4000 workers but each factory is medium scale. 
 
13) International Trade Connection 
14)  Tiffiny’s Wear Limited 
15)  Four Wings Limited 
16) Saville Row Limited 
Owner: Zafar Osman (Managing Director) 
Location: Mohakhali 
Type of factory: Modern integrated knitting. Currently engaged in significant technology upgrading by 
setting up new composite textile knitting mill with assistance from DANIDA on technology acquisition 
and with Danish partnership. 
 
17) DefoinBd. Ltd. 
18) Defoin Embroidery Ltd. 
19) Jaantex Apparel Ltd. 
Owner: Zafar Iqbal Siddique (Managing Director) 
Location: Mirpur 
Type of factory: Screen printing & Embroidery using labour-intensive technologies. Plans to attempt 
technology upgrading by setting up machine-based printing plant in Gazipur. 
 
20)  Surma GarmentsLtd. 
21)  Savar Textiles Ltd. 
22) Supasox Ltd. 
23) Smart Sox Ltd. 
Owner: Towhid Samad (Managing Director) 
Location: Savar 
Type of factory: Hosiery 
 
24) Bengal Jeans Ltd. 
Owner: Shawkat uz Zaman (Managing Director) 
Location: Uttara 
Type of factory: Denim bottoms 
 
25) Bengal Indigo 
Owner: Nassir Khan (Managing Director) 
Location: Uttara 
Type of factory: Sweaters / Dyeing  
 
26 Mode Group 
27) Proud Textiles Ltd. 
28) Century Apparels Ltd. 
29) Padma Embroidery Ltd. 
30) Rahmat Sweater (Bd.) Ltd. 
31) Sabuj Knitting & Dyeing Industry Ltd. 
Owner: Adnan Chowdhury (Managing Director) 
Location: Around Dhaka, Headquarters Dhanmondi 
Types of factory: shirts & sweaters, embroidery, knitting mainly in leased-in medium scale factories.   
 
32) FarEast Knitting and Dyeing Industries. 
Owner: Asif Moyeen (Managing Director) 
Location: Savar 
Type of Factory: Large-scale integrated modern (2100+ workers) knitting, dyeing and garmenting. 
Ongoing plans of technology upgrading based largely on reinvested profits. 
 
33) Panache Knitted Creations. 
Owner: Majed Khan (Managing Director) 
Location: Gazipur 
Type of factory: Medium scale sweater factory, around 500 workers. 
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34) Knit Fasions. 
35) Square Attires. 
36) Plummy Fashions. 
Owner: Fazlul Haque (Managing Director) 
Type of factory: Knitwear, T-shirts, with backward linkages into dyeing. Total around 1200 employees. 
Owner also head of BKMEA. 
 
 
LIST OF BANKS 
 
 
37) IFIC  
– Wackar Hassan (Executive Vice President) 
 – Mashiur Rahman (Managing Director) 
 – Chowdhury Aktar Asif (Manager, Project Loan) 
 
  
38)  Bangladesh Bank  
– Md. Khurshid-ul-Alam (Executive Director) 
 
 
39) Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd.  
– A.T.M. Harun-ur-Rashid Chowdhury,  
– Mohammad Abdul Mannan (Deputy Executive President) 
– Kh. Md. Munirul Alam Al- Mamoon,  
– Md. Siddiqur Rahman (Assistant Vice President) 
 
 
OTHERS 
 
40) GTZ  
– David Ambadar (Project Manager, promotion of SMEs & private sector),  
– Dietrich Stolz (Program Coordinator PROGRESS – Promotion of Social Environmental & 
Production Standards in RMG Sector) 
 
 
41)  Royal Danish Embassy  
 – Ib Albertsen (Programme Coordinator B2B programme) 
 
42) Garment Industry Management Academy 
 Private Training Centre 
Hilary Fernando (Principal Consultant). 
 
 
The interviews were conducted through 2007 and the stakeholder conference was held on the 9th of 
September in Dhaka. We are grateful to all the participants for sparing their valuable time to participate 
in this process, and to UNDP Bangladesh for enabling this process. 
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